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CAN FOOD COMPANIES BE TRUSTED
TO SELF-REGULATE? AN ANALYSIS OF
CORPORATE LOBBYING AND DECEPTION
TO UNDERMINE CHILDREN'S HEALTH
Michele Simon, JD, MPH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite rising levels of childhood obesity and diabetes, coupled
with complaints from public health and children's advocates about
the connection to excessive marketing of junk food to children,' the
government has maintained a hands-off policy in this area. Instead,
the food industry is expected to police itself, with modest guidance
from federal regulators.
This hands-off policy was made plain last July when the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) co-hosted a workshop entitled, "Marketing, Self-
Regulation, and Childhood Obesity."2 A full two-thirds of the V an-
elists had financial ties to either the food or advertising industry. In
addition, executives from Kraft and PepsiCo were each given two
separate opportunities to speak, an honor not bestowed on anyone
* Professor of Health Policy, University of California, Hastings College of
Law. Michele Simon directs the Center for Informed Food Choices, a
nonprofit organization based in Oakland, California. The author wishes to
thank Christine Treveloni and Lisa Soflo for their outstanding research
assistance.
1. See Susan Linn & Josh Golin, Beyond Commercials: How Food
Marketers Target Children, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 13 (2006).
2. For information regarding the workshop, including press releases and
transcripts of the event, see the FTC Web site, Marketing, Self Regulation and
Childhood Obesity, July 2005 Workshop, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
Foodmarketingtokids.
3. See Michele Simon, Government Abandons Children to Big Food,
ALTERNET, July 22, 2005, http://alternet.org/story/23648; see also FTC Web
site, supra note 2.
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else.4 Any advocate voices to be heard were often drowned out.
The only reason the FTC and DHHS decided to hold the
meeting at all was that the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recom-
mended they do so in its 2005 report on childhood obesity. Specif-
ically, the IOM called on the DHHS to "convene a national confer-
ence to develop guidelines for the advertising and marketing of foods
[and] beverages ... directed at children."5 They also recommended
that "[t]he FTC should have the authority and resources to monitor
compliance with the food and beverage ... advertising practices."
6
What should have been a forum on how to set limits around the
marketing of junk food to children, however, turned into a public
relations opportunity for industry to demonstrate what a great job it
is doing at self-regulation and in promoting more healthful food.
With the exception of Senator Tom Harkin, Congress has done
little to protect children from the onslaught of junk-food marketing.
7
As a result of this federal inaction, state legislatures have taken an
increasing interest in addressing an important avenue for targeting
children: the ubiquitous availability of unhealthful food and bever-
ages in public schools. Yet despite an enormous amount of legisla-
tive activity, this approach has seen relatively minor success thanks
to heavy counter lobbying by the food and beverage industries.
A combination of state and local policymaking, threats of
litigation (real and perceived), and general public outcry have placed
the food and beverage industry on the defensive about the
healthfulness of its products, especially those aimed at children. Not
taking the finger pointing lying down, the food industry is
responding with a massive 1ublic relations campaign designed to
control the public dialogue. Corporate goals include deflecting
4. Mark Berlind, Executive Vice President, Global Corporate Affairs,
Kraft Foods, and Brock Leach, Sr. Vice President, New Growth Platforms, and
Chief Innovative Officer, PepsiCo, Inc., were the only panelists to speak on
more than one panel during the workshop. See FTC, Perspectives
on Marketing, Self-Regulation and Childhood Obesity, Agenda, July 14-15,
2005, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/foodmarketingtokids/
agenda.pdf.
5. COMM. ON PREVENTION OF OBESITY IN CHILDREN & YOUTH, INST. OF
MED., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE 9 (Jeffrey
P. Koplan et al. eds., 2005).
6. Id. at 177.
7. See infra Part V.C.
8. See infra Part IV.
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attempts to regulate unhealthful products and to generally create a
public perception that they are sincere in their efforts to be "part of
the solution."
There has been much debate over whether self-regulation is a
viable option, including some discussion of its effectiveness in the
realm of food marketing to children. 9 This article asks the simple
question: can we trust the food industry to self-regulate? Self-regu-
lation presupposes that corporations have the ability to recognize
their role in society as responsible citizens and will act accordingly.
Corporations, in general, have no such ability and are, by definition,
designed to further one goal and one goal only: to increase profits for
shareholders. Indeed, this is their very reason for existence.'
0
Moreover, this objective is completely inimical to the goal of
promoting public health and protecting children's welfare. Because
food companies cannot be trusted, the government must step in to
protect children's health.
This Article explains the myriad ways that food companies have
proven that they cannot be trusted to serve children's best interests.
They fall broadly into the following categories: (1) lobbying to
undermine school-based nutrition policies, (2) deceptive marketing
of so-called "healthier products," and (3) misleading public
statements of corporate marketing policies related to children.
II. CORPORATE LOBBYING TO UNDERMINE SCHOOL NUTRITION:
FouR CASE STUDIES
While the federal government focuses much of its obesity-
related efforts on educational programs and scientific research, state
legislatures are taking a more aggressive, policy-oriented approach.
The topic that has garnered the most attention by lawmakers is
school nutrition. State legislatures have become a battleground for
debates over school vending machines. Over the past three years,
almost every state in the nation has proposed legislation that would
address the sale of soda and junk food in public schools."
9. For an excellent discussion of requirements for effective self-regulation,
see Angela Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711
(1999).
10. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
11. Data compiled by the Center for Informed Food Choices (on file with
author); see also HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERV., STATE ACTIONS TO
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A. Schools Becoming a Junk Food Free-for-All
Most of the controversy has been over the sale of soda and, to a
lesser extent, snack foods. These are foods and beverages sold
outside the school meal program and are collectively known as
"competitive foods" because they compete with the sale of school
meals. For public schools that participate in the National School
Lunch Program, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) sets
nutrition standards that schools must follow in order to get
reimbursed by the federal government.12 With the exception of one
regulation that does not allow the sale of soda or certain candy in the
food service area during mealtimes, no federal nutrition standards
apply to competitive foods.
13
A 2001 report to Congress by the USDA cited several problems
with competitive. foods, including their "diet-related health risks,"
their impact on the financial viability of school meal programs, and
sending children mixed messages related to nutrition and healthy
food choices. 14
PROMOTE NUTRITION, INCREASE PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND PREVENT OBESITY:
A LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW (2005), http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/July%
202005%20-%20Report.pdf.
12. Requirements for School Food Authority Participation, 7 C.F.R.
§ 210.10 (2005).
13. Section 210.11 (b) of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that
"[s]tate agencies and school food authorities shall... prohibit the sale of foods
of minimal nutritional value... . The sale of other competitive foods may, at
the discretion of the State agency and school food authority, be allowed .... "
Foods of "minimal nutritional value" are defined as, "[iun the case of artifi-
cially sweetened foods, a food which provides less than five percent of the
Referenced Daily Intakes (RDI) for each of eight specified nutrients per
serving; and in the case of all other foods, a food which provides less than five
percent of the RDI for each of eight specified nutrients per 100 calories and
less than five percent of the RDI for each of eight specified nutrients per
serving... protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, niacin, riboflavin, thiamin, calcium,
and iron." 7 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(2)
14. Letter from Shirley R. Watkins, Under-Sec'y for Food, Nutrition, and
Consumer Serv., USDA, to the Honorable Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on
Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. Senate (Jan. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/Lunch/CompetitiveFoods/report-congress.htm
(entitled Foods Sold in Competition with USDA School Meal Programs: A
Report to Congress).
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With public schools so desperate for funding, over the past two
decades many districts have opened their doors to major beverage
companies such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, often forming exclu-
sive contracts also known as "pouring rights." These deals are
usually presented as being very lucrative to districts, with schools
offered enticing incentives such as sports marquees or cash bonuses.
Sometimes these exclusive contracts can lock a district in for many
years with the same vendor and the same unhealthful options.
Usually the amount of money a school district receives is dependent
on soda sales, thus creating a conflict of interest between health and
profit.1
5
In recent years, many people have begun questioning the
wisdom of these arrangements. Major cities across the country that
no longer allow schools to sell soda include New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Boston.' 6 As a result of
this grassroots effort and a collective realization that policy making
one school district at a time is inefficient, state legislatures have
taken up the matter.
The result so far has been a mix of compromised victories and
crushing defeats. In many cases, advocates spend enormous amounts
of time and energy trying to get a bill passed, obtaining an impress-
sive amount of public support, only to be out gunned by corporate
lobbyists. From 2003-2005, forty-five states introduced 287 bills
which sought to limit the availability of soft drinks and junk food in
public schools. 17 Only twenty-one states were successful in Rpassing
any bill; and only thirty-one bills out of the 287 were enacted.
15. For an excellent report on soda contracting in California, see PUB.
HEALTH INST. PREVALENCE AND SPECIFICS OF DISTRICT-WIDE BEVERAGE
CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA'S LARGEST SCHOOL DISTRICTS: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002), http://www.calendow.org/news/press-releases/
2002/special/pressO4O4O2/pdfs/sodastudy.pdf.
16. ROss E. GETMAN, SODA IN SCHOOL: ILLEGALITY OF EXCLUSIVE
"POURING RIGHTS" AGREEMENTS IN SCHOOL, http://www.schoolpouringrights
.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
17. Many bills also contained other provisions and several states passed
more than one bill. The data summarized comes from multiple sources. See
HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERV., supra note 11; National Conference of
State Legislatures http://www.ncsl.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2006). Other
sources used to summarize data can be found on individual state Web sites, the
data of which is on file with author.
18. See supra note 17.
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Of the thirty-one enacted bills, in many cases, the language changed
significantly from the version that was introduced to the version that
was passed. Often, what would have been a stronger, more restrict-
tive bill, wound up being a weaker, watered-down version.' 9 For
example, language may have gone from setting strong nutrition
standards to merely recommending that schools pass some sort of
policy, thus making compliance entirely voluntary.
While we cannot place all of the blame for failed bills on the
food and beverage industry, it is clear in many cases that trade
associations and individual companies had a heavy hand in lobbying
against these bills. This Part describes several examples through
ongoing research conducted by my organization, the Center for
Informed Food Choices. Many of the stories were collected through
one-on-one interviews with lawmakers and advocates.
B. Case Study I.- California's Soda Bill
Often a policy bellwether for the nation, California has been a
hotbed of activity for school nutrition for years, well before the idea
caught on with the rest of the nation. In 2002, thanks to an enormous
amount of organizing, the Los Angeles Unified School District (the
nation's second largest) unanimously passed a policy to prohibit the
sale of soda in schools, becoming the first in the nation to do so.
21
That victory inspired many others around the state and the country.
In 2003, grassroots momentum resulted in proposed legislation
that would have stopped soda sales in all public schools throughout
the entire state, kindergarten through twelfth grade.22 The nonprofit
advocacy group,, California Center for Public Health Advocacy
(CCPHA) led the charge to pass this ground-breaking bill, which was
sponsored by California State Senator Deborah Ortiz.23 CCPHA and
19. See, e.g., HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERV., supra note 11, at 80
("Maine's Gov. John Balducci (D) signed a watered down version of [a bill],
which sought to implement the recommendations of the Commission to Study
Public Health that Concerns Schools, Children and Nutrition.").
20. See infra Part III.
21. This policy took effect in January 2004. For a complete history of this
victory, see CTR. FOR FOOD & JUSTICE, OCCIDENTAL COLL., CHALLENGING
THE SODA COMPANIES: THE Los ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT SODA
BAN (Sept. 2002), http://departments.oxy.edu/uepi/cfj/resources/SodaBan.htm.
22. S.B. 677, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess.(Cal. 2003).
23. See California Center for Public Health Advocacy, http://www.public
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others presented overwhelming scientific evidence of a growing
public health menace caused by children drinking too much soda,
much of which is consumed at school.24 What should have been a no
brainer, protecting kids' health, turned into a bitter battle involving
the industry's heaviest hitters.
Wasting no time, the soda industry mounted a strong opposition.
According to one observer, "[y]ou could see the Coke and Pepsi
lobbyists running down the halls after the legislators. They were
there in full force." 25 According to Senator Ortiz, the industry front
group, Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF) hired two lobbying
firms known for raising money for Republicans and moderate
Democrats. 26 Also, a nutritionist representing CCF testified against
the bill, but did not disclose her affiliation and bias-a typical
industry tactic.27 How can lawmakers trust the testimony of a so-
called expert if they don't know who is paying the bills? One
industry consultant admitted with pride that this is their strategy: to
hire what they call "third-party experts" who have no obvious
affiliation with industry. 28 This way, the expert's research creden-
tials serve as the basis for their credibility and the testimony is
deemed objective and scientific. Trouble is, bought-and-paid-for
science is anything but objective and can easily be manipulated to
obtain the desired outcome. The tobacco industry wrote the book on
that tactic years ago while fighting off government's attempt to
regulate it.
29
healthadvocacy.org/limits (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
24. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON HEALTH, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 677, 2003-2004
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4-5 (Cal. 2003), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/
pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_677_cfa_20030701_110316_asmcomm
.html.
25. Telephone Interview with Jacqueline Domac, Health Teacher, Venice
High School, in Venice, Cal. (Aug. 30, 2004).
26. Telephone Interview with Senator Deborah Ortiz, Cal. State Senate, in
Sacramento, Cal. (Aug. 30, 2004).
27. Id.
28. Interview with Terrence Gaffney, Consultant, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 10,
2004). The soda industry also sent paid consultants to testify at hearings in
Philadelphia without revealing their affiliation. Interview with John Weidman,
Senior Associate, The Food Trust, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Aug. 8, 2005). These
experts presented industry-sponsored data to show that soda does not cause
obesity. Id.
29. See, e.g, Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, Tobacco's Secondhand
Science of Smoke-Filled Rooms, PRWATCH, Third Quarter 2000, at 10.
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Another industry strategy is personal attacks, especially when
they cannot argue the facts. Ortiz has come under attack numerous
times by CCF for her nutrition advocacy efforts. "Their tactics are
horrific. Their strategy is to attack the individual to discredit them.
And this can get very ugly," she said.30 Ortiz told me that CCF's
verbal assaults against her have even included oblique references to
her being forty and single.31 Also, the Cal-Nevada Soft Drink Asso-
ciation, who was strongly in opposition, regularly contributes to
members on the relevant committees. "They throw around quite a bit
of money," Ortiz said.32 And industry expects a good return on that
investment.
A combination of behind-the-scenes and up-front industry
lobbying on California's 2003 soda bill resulted in a compromise: to
allow the sale of sodas only in high schools. 33 Not coincidentally,
most sodas in schools are sold at the high school level. Such an
exemption was never the intent of either the nutrition advocates or
Senator Ortiz, the people proposing the law in the first place.
What ensued was a legislative debate over whether high school
students were "old enough" to make their own choices when it
comes to drinking soda.34 This served as a convenient smokescreen
for what was really at stake: the huge economic benefit to industry to
maintain their significant presence in high schools. Behind the
scenes, industry put pressure on certain key members of the
California Assembly to do their bidding.35 For example, Charles
Frommer, then chair of the Assembly Health Committee, made the
absurd argument that many "high school students were eighteen
years old, able to vote, could serve in the military, so [they] should
be able to make their own decisions." 36 Senator Ortiz countered that,
at most, twelfth graders are eighteen for half their senior year.
37
"And it's a time at which key decisions are being made, and where
30. Interview with Senator Deborah Ortiz, supra note 26.
31. When I later shared this story with a colleague who studies tobacco
industry tactics (including how they target homosexuals), she explained that
this is their subtle way of suggesting that Ortiz is a lesbian.
32. Interview with Senator Deborah Ortiz, supra note 26.
33. S.B. 677, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
34. Interview with Senator Deborah Ortiz, supra note 26.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the greatest marketing advantage is for industry" she said.38
In the end, procedural tactics trumped public health. Because
the health committee held no debate on the forced amendment to
exempt high schools, Ortiz's bill would either die in its entirety, or it
would survive with a ban on sodas for grades K-8 only.39 Ortiz took
the compromise, but was very frustrated: "I was prepared to have the
bill die. I really felt it was a compromise that was unacceptable. But
my sponsors, who were the advocates, really felt it was a win, and I
allowed them to make the call. I am still disappointed to this day."
40
Some advocates were troubled by the weakened legislation,
including Jacqueline Domac, who helped pass a policy to remove
both soda and junk food throughout the Los Angeles Unified School
District. Domac says that she "find[s] it quite interesting that we
only care about kids until the 8th grade and suddenly in high school,
their health is insignificant ... [a]s a high school teacher, how do I
explain to my students that they are just not important [to
lawmakers]? ' 4 Why is exempting high schools so critical to indus-
try? Domac agrees with Ortiz that it is all about brand loyalty: "It's
during the high school years that kids form lifestyle habits. That is
when a student decides between Coke and Pepsi, and that decision
lasts for a lifetime."
42
Postscript: It, seems that the tide in California has finally turned.
In September 2005, California's Republican Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed into a law a bill that will eventually get soda
out of high schools by 2009. 43 Having the governor sponsor the bill
made a tremendous difference this time around.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Telephone Interview with Jacqueline Domac, supra note 25.
42. Id.
43. S.B. 965, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). The bill provides
that by 2007, 50% of vending machine slots must no longer contain soda, and
that by 2009, no soda can be sold in high schools. Id.
May 2006)
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C. Case Study II: Junk-food Bill in California
Not satisfied with just going after soda, California nutrition
advocates next set their sights on ridding schools of junk food. A
2003 survey of California schools revealed that almost seventy-five
percent of schools sold foods such as soda, candy, chips, cakes, and
cookies through vending machines.4 With rising rates of childhood
obesity and diabetes, California State Senator Martha Escutia took
the lead in 2003, authoring a bill to address this problem.45  The
legislation was aimed at establishing reasonable nutrition standards
on all foods sold outside the school lunch program.46 The California
Center for Public Health Advocacy ensured that the nutrition
guidelines were thoroughly reviewed. First developed in 2001 by a
panel of ten nationally-recognized school nutrition experts, the rules
were further refined by the state legislature over a period of three
years.4 8 In support of the bill were no fewer than eighty organi-
zations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the
California Medical Association, the California Teachers Association,
and the California State PTA.49 Only five organizations opposed the
legislation-four of them industry groups. 50 A key opponent was the
Grocery Manufacturer's Association (GMA), whose 120 members
enjoy annual sales of more than $680 billion in the United States
alone, and consist of major food corporations such as Kraft, Mars,
and PepsiCo.5 1 GMA was already on record as opposing virtually
44. PUB. HEALTH INST., THE 2003 CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL FAST FOOD
SURVEY (2003), http://www.califomiaprojectlean.org/Assets/1019/files/2003
FastFoodSurvey.pdf.
45. S.B. 1566, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
46. Id.
47. See California Center for Public Health Advocacy, California Limits
School Junk Food, http://www.publichealthadvocacy.org/limits (last visited
Oct. 12, 2005).
48. See Carla Niflo & Michele Simon, Strange Bedfellows Sell Out
Children's Health, SACRAMENTO UPDATE, Oct. 2004, at 3, available at
http://www.capta.org/sections/advocacy/downloads/sac-2004-1 0.pdf.
49. ASSEMB. COMM. ON EDUC., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1566, 2003-2004
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7-10 (Cal. 2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/sen/sb_1551-1600/sb_1566_cfa_20040622_114541_asm comm.html.
50. Id.
51. See Grocery Manufacturer's Association, http://www.gmabrands.com
(last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (follow "Complete Member Listing" hyperlink for
current membership) (boasting that its member companies account for more
than $680 billion in annual sales).
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every state bill across the nation that would restrict the sale of junk
food or soda in schools.5 2 A state the size of California is a large
market for the industry, so a defeat there would be devastating both
for the lost profits and because of the potential domino effect. Just as
in the soda wars, industry was not about to go down without a big
fight. But this time, corporate interests found an unlikely ally.
While it was predictable that the junk-food industry would
strongly oppose the measure, advocates were surprised to learn that
joining the opposition was the California School Food Service Asso-
ciation (CSFSA), an organization of school nutritionists, food
managers, and educators.5 3 Oddly, CSFSA stood alone in opposition
among public sector organizations.
The group's chief complaint was that cash-strapped schools
need the money that comes from any and all food sales.54  But
students were never supposed to be responsible for subsidizing their
public education with their pocket change in the first place.
Moreover, advocates countered, schools in Los Angeles and around
the country have proven they can make more money selling more
healthful options.
CSFSA also argued that the bill's nutrition standards were
overly restrictive,5 6 but an expert panel stood behind these
standards.5 7 In contrast, the food service group's proposed nutrition
guidelines would have allowed all foods and beverages to be served
or sold on school campuses, which obviously amounts to no
52. See id. (A search for "schools" results in 126 hits, most of which
represents a document publicly filed in opposition to school based policy
initiatives).
53. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON EDUC., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1566, 20032004
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 10 (Cal. 2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/
sen/sb 1551-1600/sb_1566 cfa 20040622_114541_asm comm.html (listing
CSFSA as being officially opposed to the bill).
54. See SENATE HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B.
1566, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 2004), available at http://
www.leginfo.ca.govlpub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1551-
1600/sb 1566_cfa_20040322_150542_sen comm.html (discussing CSFSA's
position on the bill).
55. See Nifto & Simon, supra note 48, at 3.
56. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON EDUC., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1566, 20032004
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 10 (Cal. 2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/
sen/sb 1551-1600/sb 1566 cfa 20040622 114541 asm comm.html.
57. See Nifto & Simon, supra note 48, at 3. - -
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standards at all.58  They maintained that their "recommendations
focus on limiting calories and portion sizes rather than labeling
'good' and 'bad' foods," citing the American Dietetic Association
(ADA) for credibility.5 9 While it is true that the ADA espouses the
"no good foods/bad foods" rhetoric, the organization's numerous
corporate sponsors have seriously compromised its scientific
60integrity.
It is not uncommon for lobbying groups to try to persuade
legislators to vote a certain way by issuing what is known as a "floor
alert." Its purpose is to succinctly spell out what is at stake with a
particular piece of legislation. In the best of circumstances, a floor
alert can serve as a legitimate educational tool. However, the tactic
can also be abused, especially if it is issued just before the vote,
when lawmakers have the least amount of time to check the facts and
come to a truly well-informed decision.
At the last minute before the vote on the nutrition standards bill,
CSFSA distributed just such a floor alert, urging legislators to vote
against the bill. 61 The two-page document, in large, bold type urged
lawmakers to oppose the bill, mostly repeating the scare tactic that
serious revenue losses would result if the bill were to pass. 62 On the
last day of California's 2004 legislative session, the bill was defeated
by only five votes, even after a second roll call.
63
While it is not unusual to see disagreement among advocacy
groups with similar goals, it is sad when so much is at stake. In the
end, the children suffer because the adults cannot come together and
agree on a strategy. It is especially troubling when the real enemy is
so formidable. The food industry benefits when the nutrition advo-
cates are splintered. The GMA must have been thrilled to have the
CSFSA essentially make the industry's arguments on the floor of the
58. CAL. SCH. FOOD SERV. ASS'N, CHOOSE SENSIBLY: RECOMMENDED
NUTRITION STANDARDS, http://www.csfsa.org/documents/nutritionstandards%
201%2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
59. Id.
60. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 126-29 (2002).
61. See Nifto & Simon, supra note 48, at 3.
62. Floor Alert, Oppose S.B. 1566, CSFSA (on file with author).
63. See Niflo & Simon, supra note 48, at 3; see also COMPLETE BILL
HISTORY, S.B. 1566, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1551-
1600/sb_1566_bill_20041130_history.html.
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legislature. It is always better for a message that benefits business to
come from school-based representatives rather than corporate
lobbyists. Indeed, this is a common tactic of industry-to quietly
stand back while a group with more credibility does the up-front
lobbying. And this time, the strategy worked like a charm.
Postscript: In September 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger
signed into law another bill to get rid of junk food in schools.
64
Again, his support made the difference.
D. Case Study III: Kentucky's Four-Year Battle
After three previously unsuccessful attempts to improve the
nutritional content of products in school vending machines in
Kentucky, in March 2005, the state legislature finally passed a
compromise bill that only removes soda from elementary schools.
65
Veteran dietician Carolyn Dennis, chair of the Kentucky Action for
Healthy Kids Taskforce, has battled Coca-Cola lobbyists for four
years.66  Kentucky already has a regulation that says vending
machines are not supposed to be turned on until thirty minutes after
the last lunch period.67 However, as is often the case, Dennis says
the rule is not enforced, so the machines are turned on first thing in
the morning.68 "[A]nd these little kids, they have no judgment; they
spend all of their money on candy bars, Coke, and potato chips. And
that's what they have, for breakfast and for lunch," she said.
6 9
Some elementary school principals even announce "soft drink
breaks" in the afternoon. Dennis explains:
[O]ne of my task force members was giving a health talk to
third-graders--that's eight and nine year old children and
she was interrupted at 2 p.m. when the principal came over
the loudspeaker and said, 'Ok, children, it's time for your
afternoon soft drink break,' at which point, all but four or
five children who couldn't afford it ... took their money
and followed the teacher out the door, and came back with
64. S.B. 12, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
65. S.B. 172, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005).
66. See Telephone Interview with Carolyn Dennis, Chair, Ky. Action for
Healthy Kids Taskforce, in Georgetown, Ky. (Mar. 13, 2005).
67. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.854(3) (West 2005), available at http://
www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/1 58-00/854.pdf.
68. Telephone Interview with Carolyn Dennis, supra note 66.
69. Id.
May 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:169
their 20 oz. Coke or Pepsi, and she continued her health
talk. She couldn't believe it, no one made any connection.7 °
As a result of these and similar problems, Dennis joined a coali-
tion called the ,Taskforce on Childhood Nutrition and Physical
Activity and got to work trying to pass legislation to set nutrition
standards. 71 "The first year," Dennis recalls, "the NSDA [National
Soft Drink Association-now the American Beverage Association]
sent four lobbyists to kill the bill."72 The Kentucky Beverage Asso-
ciation (KBA) representative, Ray Gillespie, testified that "there
were no soft drinks in elementary schools," remembers Dennis,
"which was totally a lie."
73
By the fourth attempt, allowing schools to continue to sell soda
in middle and high schools was the only way the bill could possibly
pass. According to Dennis, "We tried to get 75% of beverages to be
healthy K-12, but the beverage association went ballistic on that one
because they wanted to be able to sell Gatorade, etc .... 74
Dennis' team also started tracking campaign contributions.
"One of our task force members filed an ethics complaint against the
president of the state senate because he accepted money from the soft
drink industry ... We found that a whole lot of legislators accept
money from them, it doesn't matter which party or which chamber
you're in," she said.75
Coca-Cola's lobbyist even objected to using the language
"healthy beverages" to replace soda, apparently worried about the
implications for its flagship product's reputation.76 Coke said they
could live with the ban in elementary schools if the bill did not say
"healthy." Dennis explains, "The Coke lobbyist wanted [the
language] 'school-day appropriate beverages.' We debate[d] it for
hours, and finally my colleagues said 'Look, if this will get them off
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. A survey of Kentucky schools revealed that 44% of elementary
schools had vending machines. See JANET TIETYEN, KENTUCKY SCHOOL
NUTRITION ENVIRONMENT SURVEY (2002), http://www.ca.uky.edu/fcs/healthy
kids/2002/PDF/survey.Tietyen.report.pdf; infra note 252 and accompanying
text.
74. Telephone Interview with Carolyn Dennis, supra note 66.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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our backs, let's do it' ... then we compromised on 'school-day
approved', which I didn't agree with because I don't like the word
'approved."'77 Dennis likens it to a David and Goliath battle.78
All these lobbyists ... work together. The Grocery
Manufacturers Association ... fought us big time, too. I
saw them working with the soft drink lobbyists a lot ... I
was told the very first year [by someone from the ethics
commission] that next to the pharmaceutical association,
you are up against the second-biggest lobby going, and
that's the soft drink lobby.
79
Dennis has sobering advice for other advocates.
You really need to have someone in the capital on [a] daily
basis. Because to really understand what's going on, you
need to know the players, you need to know who the
lobbyists are, and who you're up against. You need to be
constantly talking to legislators ... [P]aid lobbyists have
such an advantage because they are there every day and all
year long and they develop relationships with legislators.
80
E. Case Study IV: Connecticut Governor's Coke Connection
In June 2005, Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell vetoed what
would have been the nation's strongest school-based nutrition law.
8 '
With one stroke of the pen, she put to rest an extremely contentious
battle to rid Connecticut schools of soda and junk food.
This was the fourth try to get a bill passed in Connecticut. In
2004, advocates attempted to set nutrition guidelines on food and
beverages, but ended up with a gutted law.82 Lucy Nolan, Executive
Director of End Hunger Connecticut, the bill's lead sponsor, says the
soda companies have some of the best lobbyists: "Coke has the
number one lobbyist in the state. And PepsiCo has a pretty good one
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Michele Simon, Junk Food Lobby Wins Again, ALTERNET, June 17,
2005, http://www.altemet.org/envirohealth/22259/.
82. Michele Simon, Thirst For Profit, MOTHERING, Mar.-Apr. 2005,
http://www.informedeating.org/thirstforprofit2.pdf.
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too. They have lobbyists there who look out for legislation."8 3
According to Nolan, the Coca-Cola lobbyist even went around
saying that if the concern was diabetes, 100% fruit juice was just as
bad as soda.84 Nolan then had to draft legislation explaining why
juice is better than soda.85 In the end, they did not have enough
backing. "Pepsi just worked the bill to death. And we thought we
had really good votes on it, [but then] we just watched the vote count
go down. I was, surprised at how the soda companies really went
after it," she said.86
In 2005, Nolan and her colleagues tried again with a bill that
would have allowed only water, juice, and milk to be sold during the
school day in grades K-12.87 Once again, advocates faced heavy
lobbying by the soft drink industry and a highly politicized
legislative battle.
88
To do its bidding, Coca-Cola hired Patrick Sullivan, of Sullivan
& LeShane, called "the most influential lobbying firm in the state."
89
For his services, Sullivan is paid $80,000 annually by Coca-Cola's
New York division, plus an additional $7,350 a month by its New
England subsidiary.9 0 The Connecticut Pepsi Bottlers Association
hired Jay F. Malcynsky of Gaffney, Bennett & Associates, the
biggest lobbying firm in Connecticut.91 According to Ethics Com-
mission records, Pepsi pays Gaffney, Bennett $50,000 a year in
fees.92 Together, the two firms spent a quarter of a million dollars
trying to kill the bill.93
83. Telephone Interview with Lucy Nolan, Executive Director, End Hunger
Conn., in Hartford, Conn. (Aug. 24, 2004).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Sullivan & LeShane, http://www.ctlobby.com/govrelations/html/in
dexre.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
90. Gregory B. Hladky, Soda Makers Pull Out All Stops to Put Big Chill on
School Ban, BRISTOL PRESS, May 7, 2005, http://www.bristolpress.com/site/
news.cfm?newsid=14486223&BRD=1643&PAG=46 1&dept.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. CT Gov. Rell Kow Tows to Big Cola on Junk Food, http://www.daily
kos.com/storyonly/2005/7/30/112038/037 (July 20, 2005, 09:20:38 PDT).
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The political struggle involved an eight-hour House debate in
which lawmakers engaged in such absurd stall tactics as relating
memories of being deprived of candy as a child.94 The House finally
passed a compromise bill that allowed diet soda and sports drinks to
be sold in high schools after the lunch period.95 Then the bill had to
go back to the Senate, where it had already passed. But this time,
lawmakers there attempted to delay the process by adding no fewer
than ten unrelated amendments, such as requiring smoke detectors in
school bathrooms.
96
Other underhanded tactics included Coca-Cola's lobbyists
sharing data regarding school income from soda sales with
lawmakers behind closed doors so that advocates could not refute the
information. 97 Also, a well-stocked Coca-Cola cooler was delivered
to the Democratic caucus room in the Capitol just before the House
was expected to vote on the bill. 98 Nolan called the timing "very
suspicious."99 And in a particularly devious move, while the bill
awaited the governor's signature, a sign mysteriously appeared taped
to the inside of a high school vending machine that read: "Let the
state know how you feel about the state getting into your lunch
program," followed by Governor Rell's e-mail address and phone
number. 00 The sign was not approved by the school, as required for
all public postings.'
0'
94. Alison Leigh Cowan, Food Fight: Are School Vending Machines a
Sweet Deal, or Simply Providing Sweets?, N.Y. TIMES (Conn. Edition), May
29, 2005, at 1 (noting that this was far longer than debates over the death
penalty or same-sex marriage).
95. See E-mail from Lucy Nolan, Executive Director, End Hunger Conn., to
author (May 19, 2005, 09:06 EST) (on file with author).
96. See E-mail from Nancy Alderman, President, Env't & Human Health,
Inc., to author (May-24, 2005, 12:40 EST) (on file with author).
97. Cowan, supra note 94.
98. Alison Leigh Cowan, Healthy Food in the Lunchroom? First, You
Need a Health Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at B 1.
99. Id.
100. A photo of the sign can be viewed at http://mysite.verizon.net/
vze443zw/pouringrights/rellphoto.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
101. See E-mail from Lucy Nolan, Executive Director, End Hunger Conn., to
author (June 9, 2005, 06:52 EST) (on file with author).
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Nolan's group lined up an impressive array of supporters,
including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
College of Preventive Medicine, the American Diabetes Foundation,
the American Heart Association, the Center for Science in the Public
Interest, the Connecticut PTA, the Connecticut State Dental
Association, and the Connecticut Nurses Association. 102 Also,
according to one survey, seventy percent of the state's residents
favored the bill. 1
03
In the end, even with public support, the compromise bill was
too much for the governor to sign. 1 4 Ironically, the most common
argument made against such bills is that schools should maintain
"local control" over nutrition policy. Indeed, Governor Rell invoked
the word "local" no fewer than sixteen times in her three-page veto
message.' 05 However, her reasoning is hard to swallow. Many
school policies are made at the state and even national level, such as
President Bush's notorious "No Child Left Behind" policy.
What Connecticut Governor Rell failed to mention in her veto
message was a possible conflict of interest: the cofounder of Coca-
Cola's lobbying firm, Patricia LeShane, served as the governor's
campaign advisor. 10 6 Also, the LeShane lobbying firm contributed to
Rell's successful. 2002 campaign for lieutenant governor. 10 7  The
lobbying money spent fighting this bill was such a great factor in the
debate that it motivated the state's Senate President Pro Tem. Donald
Williams Jr. (a strong proponent of the nutrition bill) to take
102. See Educ. Comm., Report on Bills Favorably Reported by Committee,
S.B. 1309 (Conn. 2005), http://www.jblei.com/EHC_/attachments/JFReport_
1309.pdf.
103. Mark Winne, Battling Big Cola, IN THESE TMEs, June 16, 2005,
http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/2161 (citing a statewide opinion
poll conducted by the Connecticut Center for Research and Analysis).
104. Press Release, Conn. Governor's Office, Governor Rell Vetoes School
Nutrition Bill (June 14, 2005) (including Gov. Rell's veto message),
http://www.ct.gov/govemorrell/cwp/view.asp?A =1 761&Q=294564.
105. Id.
106. Sullivan & LeShane, Firm Bios, Patricia "Paddi" LeShane, http://www
.ctlobby.com/shared/bios/b-patricia.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
107. Patricia LeShane contributed a total of $1300 to the 2002 Connecticut
gubernatorial campaign. Followthemoney.org, State at a Glance: Connecticut
2002, Contributors, LeShane, Patricia, http://followthemoney.org/database/
StateGlance/contributor.phtml?si=20027&d=4533548 (last visited Aug. 30,
2005).
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concerted action for the first time on campaign finance reform. 1
08
III. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF UNDERMINING SCHOOL NUTRITION
A. Big Soda Lobbying Against Improving School Beverages
In addition to the above examples, Coca-Cola has undermined
school nutrition policies with heavy-handed lobbying tactics all over
the nation. PepsiCo and regional soft drink associations have been
lobbying hard as well. Below are just a few examples of policies that
were compromised or completely killed as a result of industry
actions:
Arizona: In April 2005, Arizona passed a law that bans the sale
of soft drinks and candy during the school day, but only for grades
K-8. 10 9 High schools were exempted as a compromise measure due
to heavy industry lobbying." 0 The provision that would have ex-
tended the ban to high schools was added and removed from the bill
several times and, ultimately, the soda lobby won.Ill
Indiana: In June 2004, at the "Summit on Obesity" sponsored by
Time Magazine and ABC News, Tommy Thompson, then U.S.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, claimed that Coca-Cola
was a responsible corporate citizen.1 12 In response, Charles Brown,
Chairman of Indiana's Public Health Committee, asked why such a
responsible corporate citizen would send a team of five lobbyists
(including a regional vice president) to defeat his bill that would
108. Mark Pazniokas, Reform Effort Gains Steam, HARTFORD COURANT,
May 12, 2005, available at http://www.cleanupconnecticut.org/news/
release.php?ID=20; see also Associated Press, Lawmakers Continue Debate
on Campaign Finance, (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.cleanupconnecticut.org/
news/release.php?ID=38 (reporting on bipartisan task force efforts to create
limitations on the influence of special interests).
109. H.B. 2544, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); see also Anne
Ryman, Napolitano Signs Ban on Sales of Junk Food, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Apr.
27, 2005, http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special12/articles/0427junkfood
27.html (noting that "high schools are exempt" from the bill).
110. See Ryman, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Tommy Thompson, U.S. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., Remarks at
the Time/ABC Summit on Obesity (June 2, 2004) (webcast available at http:
//www.rwjf.org/newsroom/activitydetail.jsp?id=10078&type=3) (author in at-
tendance) (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
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have reduced soda sales in schools by fifty percent?"
13
Maine: A policy to remove soda from all public schools K-12
that should have been implemented by fall 2004 was delayed by at
least an entire year. 114 While the Maine Department of Education
had committed to the fall 2004 implementation date, that did not
happen."15 This is most likely due to influence from soda industry
representatives who had made their opposition known loud and clear
during the legislative process." 1
6
New Mexico I: In Albuquerque, New Mexico, Pepsi-Cola has an
exclusive contract with the district, which consists of 125 schools." 
7
In 2004, when two middle schools tried to stock other vending
machines with milk, Pepsi-Cola sent a letter warning that they were
in violation of the contract.11 8 Jennie McCary, a registered dietician
with Albuquerque Public Schools recalls feeling a sense of shock at
finding that Pepsi had an exclusive contract that prevented the
district from vending milk products, and that the principals who were
trying to improve the nutritional standards for their students were
treated so poorly." 1
9
The school advisory council plans to fight the renewal of the
contract but that is not until 2007, three years after this event.
120
New Mexico II: After a hard-fought battle in 2005 in the state
legislature, pediatricians, school food directors, and nutritionists
gained approval to appoint an expert committee with the authority to
establish nutrition standards for schools, with just one catch: the
compromise legislation required that the committee include repre-
113. Id.; Interview with Representative Charles Brown, Chairman, Ind. Pub.
Health Comm., in Williamsburg, Va. (June 3, 2004).
114. As of this writing, the policy is scheduled to take effect fall 2005. E-
mail from Rep. Sean Faircloth, Me., to author (July 26, 2005, 11:34 EST) (on
file with author).
115. Sean Faircloth, Six Ways Government Promotes Obesity and What to
Do About It, DIVERSITY: ALLIED HEALTH CAREERS, Fall 2004, http://www.
diversityalliedhealth.com/features/I 1-01-04a.html.
116. Tom Bell, Maine Students to Lose Candy, Soda Machines, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 12, 2003, at A 1.
117. Telephone Interview with Jennie McCary, Registered Dietician,
Albuquerque Pub. Sch., in Albuquerque, N.M. (Aug. 11, 2004).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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sentatives of the beverage and food industry. 12 1  At the first
committee meeting, Danielle Greenburg, a doctor and obesity
researcher, said that banning soft drinks in schools isn't the solution;
rather, students need to be educated on how to balance what they
eat. 22 This doctor works for Pepsi.
123
Oregon: What started out as a relatively strong piece of state
legislation was completely gutted thanks to soda industry lobbying.
The original bill would have removed carbonated soft drinks, candy,
and fried pastry products from schools and would have set strict
nutritional and calorie requirements for other snack items. 124 The
bill that passed, however, called only for schools to have wellness
policies." 5 "An Oregon newspaper editorial squarely places the
blame with politicians bowing to corporate pressure."'
126
Sen. Vicki Walker's reconstituted bill resembles the
position favored by the Oregon Soft Drink Association,
which, coincidentally, has made hefty campaign
contributions to Walker and to two other members of the
Senate Education Committee: Sen. Ryan Deckert, D-
Beaverton, and Sen. Jeff Kruse, R-Roseburg. The three
lawmakers each received $2,000 of the $91,000 the soft
drink lobby 1oured into legislators' coffers last fall.
127
Washington D.C.: In 2003, the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS)
embarked on an effort to improve the beverage options that were
supplied by Coca-Cola. But, the company engaged in a concerted
campaign to stall those efforts. Foot dragging took the form of
claiming to conduct feasibility studies and economic analyses as well
as never returning phone calls or e-mails. 128 Coca-Cola Enterprises
sent a vice president to a meeting with DCPS to challenge the
121. Winne, supra note 103.
122. Walter Rubel, Health Specialists Urge Committee to Restrict Snacks,
DAILY TIMES (Farmington, N.M.), July 15, 2005, at A4.
123. Id.
124. Letter from author to Donald S. Clark, Fed. Trade Comm'n (June 7,
2005), available at http://ww.informedeating.org/foodmarketingtokids.html
[hereinafter FTC Letter].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Editorial, Junk Food Jitterbug: Vicki Walker Dances Away From
Tougher Rules, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), May 16, 2005, at A 10.
128. Telephone Interview with Joy Johanson, Senior Nutrition Policy
Assoc., Ctr. for Sci. 'in the Pub. Interest, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 19, 2005).
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nutrition standards that advocates had put forward, asking where the
standards came from and complaining that the company had not been
adequately consulted and would lose money.1
29
According to Joy Johansen of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest, Coke also complained that the advocates' beverage
standard for juices-which was 100% juice-was crazy because the
company had only two 100% juice products. 30 "They are a multi-
billion dollar corporation, and I think they could come up with a few
new juice products if they wanted to," she said.131
Washington State: In 2004, the state tried to pass legislation that
would have banned selling junk food and soda in schools.' 32 But,
according to Seattle School Board member Brita Butler-Wall,
seventeen revisions later, the bill was watered down significantly:
"It's pretty weak. It requires that by the fall of 2005, all schools have
some sort of policy around junk food and soda."' 3 3 She suspects
Coke had an influence on the outcome: "I know that just a few days
after we sat down with Senator Cantwell ... to talk about this ...
Coca-Cola sent out a couple of its representatives from Atlanta to
meet with her. So, that certainly didn't help matters .... ,,'34
B. Trade Association's Lobbying Machine
At every opportunity, the Grocery Manufacturer's Association
(discussed above in the California case study) puts its members'
economic interests above children's health. There is no better
evidence of this than GMA's heavy-handed lobbying related to
school nutrition. ,GMA is on record as opposing virtually every state
bill across the nation that would restrict the sale of junk food or soda
in schools. 135 A search for the word "schools" on the GMA Web site
resulted in no fewer than 126 hits, most of which are either submitted
testimony or a letter filed in opposition to a school-related nutrition
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. S.B. 5436, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
133. Telephone Interview with Brita Butler-Wall, Member, Bd. of Dir. for
Seattle Pub. Sch., in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 23 2004) (discussing WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 28A.210.360 (LexisNexis 2005)).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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policy. 136 Here are just a few examples of document titles:
* GMA Letter in Opposition of Texas Food and Beverage
Restrictions (May 18, 2005). 1'3
* GMA Letter in Opposition to Oregon School
Restrictions Bills (Mar. 3, 2005).13'
* GMA Requests Veto of Kentucky School Restrictions
Bill (Mar. 3, 2005).
139
" GMA Letter in Opposition to California School Nutrition
Bill (Mar. 6, 2005).140
" GMA Comments in Opposition to Oklahoma Food and
Beverage Restriction Bill (Feb. 5, 2005).
14 1
This lobbying campaign is quite effective. In addition to the
California case study discussed above, similar stories have been
repeated across the country. Nutrition advocates, concerned about
rising rates of childhood obesity and diabetes, are trying their best to
get their state representatives to help them rid schools of sugary
beverages and high-fat junk food. Yet, at every step along the way,
the GMA and its member companies have beat them back because
they have more lobbying resources and money to offer politicians in
the form of campaign contributions. 142 Such lobbying efforts dem-
onstrate that the nation's largest trade association of food manu-
facturers cannot be trusted to self-regulate.
C. Coca-Cola 's Disingenuous Arguments
One of Coca-Cola's favorite lobbying tactics is to make
arguments that appear to be advancing the interests of schools, but
upon closer inspection really further the company's own interests.
For example, one of the most common arguments made against
passing state-level legislation on school nutrition is that such matters
are better decided at the school level. 143 This is the classic "local
control" mantra of school administrators. In the high-powered world
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. FTC Letter, supra note 124.
143. Telephone Interview with Kari Bjorhus, Dir. of Health & Nutrition
Comm., Coca-Cola Co. (Aug. 25, 2004).
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of soda contracting, the "local control" case is now being taken up by
representatives from soda industry. For example, Kari Bjorhus,
Coca-Cola's director of Health and Nutrition Communications, said
in defense of her company's lobbying, "A lot of people ... feel very
strongly about local control... [for] the parents and the local school
administrators to have the flexibility to make decisions that are right
for them."'
144
It is ironic, and even perverse, for a multinational corporation
like Coca-Cola to argue for local control when they are thwarting the
will of local advocates. In California, even long-time local control
proponents, such as the Association of California School
Administrators (ACSA), are in support of statewide standards. 45 So,
who exactly is Coca-Cola arguing on behalf of?
"Local control is a premium," says Brett McFadden, legislative
advocate for the ACSA. He admits that it took some time for his
members to come around to supporting state guidelines, but they
eventually realized that childhood obesity was too important. "When
there is a broader statewide interest in establishing some sort of
policy," he said, "then the state has both a responsibility and the
obligation to set forth that policy."'147 Michael Butler, legislative
advocate for the California State PTA agrees, noting that "the
California State PTA believes in local control when it serves the best
interest of all children and youth, not when it serves to accelerate the
sales of carbonated beverages."'
148
Another soda industry tactic is to invoke all-American values
such as "freedom" and "choice" in the debate. According to
Bjorhus, Coca-Cola "offer[s] a wide variety of beverage choices and
... it is up to the school to decide which beverages they want to offer
their students."'149 The freedom of choice argument, that high school
students should be able to make their own choices, was made in
California. California PTA's Michael Butler says this is not a valid
argument: "I can understand [students] making healthy choices, if
144. Id.
145. Telephone Interview with Brett McFadden, Governmental Relations,
Ass'n of Cal. Sch. Admin. (Aug. 20, 2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. E-mail from Michael Butler, legislative advocate, Cal. State PTA, to
author (Aug. 20, 2004, 09:21 PST) (on file with author).
149. Telephone Interview with Kari Bjorhus, supra note 143.
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they are making choices among an array of healthy options. But...
we don't put cigarette vending machines in high schools to allow
students to have a 'choice' of using them or not."
'' 50
Rep. Sean Faircloth of Maine is turning the tables on industry's
freedom rhetoric. He says, "I find it amusing that there is a concern
about freedom of choice. [T]here is definitely a freedom of choice
problem-you can't get the healthy stuff!' 5' 1 Faircloth also argues
that by improving the options in vending machines, "the school
would be ... creating [a] small island of opportunity for healthy
choices ... We should start out with the premise that schools should
not be designed to create branding opportunities.'
5 2
D. Are Schools Getting Taken for a Ride?
In addition to the nutrition arguments, advocates are also starting
to question the conventional wisdom that soda contracts are actually
an economic boon to schools. Joy Johansen, of the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, is not convinced that schools make all
that much money from soda vending and believes "that schools have
been taken for a ride in a lot of cases ... [F]or the soda companies,
school vending appears to be more about the lifelong branding of a
captive audience of children than it is about profits".'
In April 2005, the Community Health Partnership released an
excellent study that analyzed a sampling of contracts between
Oregon school districts and beverage vendors. Among the report's
findings were:
* Vendors make more money than schools;
154
* Vendors have exclusive advertising rights to increase
products sales;15 5 and
• The average contract length was nine years, with some
150. Telephone Interview with Michael Butler, Legislative Advocate, Cal.
State PTA (Aug. 17, 2004).
151. Telephone Interview with Rep. Sean Faircloth, Me., in Bangor, Me.
(July 9, 2005).
152. Id.
153. Telephone Interview with Joy Johansen, supra note 128.
154. NICOLA PINSON, CMTY. HEALTH P'SHIP, SCHOOL SODA CONTRACTS:
A SAMPLE REVIEW OF CONTRACTS IN OREGON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS
1-2 (2004), http://www.communityhealthpartnership.org/images/pages/soda_
report/full report.pdf.
155. Id. at 2.
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contracts lasting as long as fifteen years.'
56
The report also concluded that:
Given the comparatively small amounts paid to schools by
vendors, Oregon communities may want to rethink the
restrictions placed on their freedom to purchase beverages,
and the merit of allowing companies to market and
advertise brand products in schools. In the larger picture of
school finance, beverage contracts raise a comparatively
small percentage of funds. If the fundamental purpose of
the contracts is to generate money for under-funded school
activities, are these agreements truly helping communities
achieve that goal? 157
In 2003, Texas conducted a similar analysis. Some interesting
findings:
9 Of the districts surveyed, more than half had exclusive
vending contracts;' 
58
* 63% of the districts contracted with Coca-Cola;
159
0 Total annual revenue was estimated to be
$54,180,182; 160
* 71% of school districts with more than 1,000 students
have exclusive vending contracts, with some requiring
the installation of multiple vending machines in all
schools, including elementary schools.
161
The study also noted that there were significant "non-cash
benefits" that included:
Merchandise such as shirts, school supplies, book covers,
athletic programs, sports bags, sunglasses, clocks, trophies,
plaques, soft drinks and tanks of pre-mix for soft drinks,
cups, coolers, and hats; equipment for booster clubs; movie
tickets; sponsorship of athletic events and tournaments;
[and] fountain drink dispensers. 16
2
156. Id.
157. Id. at 15.
158. TEx. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCHOOL DISTRICT VENDING CONTRACT
SURVEY (2003), http://www.squaremeals.org/fn/render/channel/items/0,1249,2
348 2515_3649_0,00.html.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Furthermore, the report cautioned about the merchandising
aspect of the arrangements:
All of this merchandise is prominently branded with the
company logos. Students are surrounded by advertising and
brand logos on school campuses and even in classrooms
throughout the school day. Some company and school
officials have acknowledged that the true purpose of these
contracts is to develop brand loyalty in students at an early
age. Exclusive vending contracts allow unlimited adver-
tising access, to their students. Research indicates that it is
difficult for young children to understand and resist the
message of advertising aimed directly at them. In some
industries a brand may represent as much as 25 percent of a
company's market value. 1
63
The Texas Comptroller's office estimated "that there may be
between 26,000 and 39,000 vending machines being operated in
Texas schools". 64 No data was available on sales, but based on
national industry figures the machines would generate considerably
more than the $54 million reported, which indicates that schools
were, indeed, being short changed. 16
5
The study ifurther estimated that statewide food service
operations potentially lose $60 million per year to competitive food
sales. 166 During the 2001 school year, the school food service opera-
tions deficit was $23.7 million and these funds had to be subsidized
from other school district sources. 1
67
No amount of money should be worth sacrificing children's
health. Still, as more information emerges about the economics
behind these soda contracts, schools should question whether they
are really getting the great deals that companies promise.
E. Soda Industry's Shameless Publicity Stunt
Feeling increasing heat from public criticism, state legislative
efforts, not to mention threats of litigation, the soda industry decided
last summer that is was time to show they really did care. On August
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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16, 2005, with much fanfare, the American Beverage Association
(ABA) announced a new school-based policy "aimed at providing
lower calorie and/or nutritious beverages to schools and limiting the
availability of soft drinks."'1 68 Newspaper accounts included such
headlines as "Soft Drink Industry Takes High Road,"'169 "Schools
Get Ally in Soda Issue: Drink Makers"'170 and "U.S. Beverage
Industry Praised for Helping in Childhood Obesity Battle."'
7 1
Unfortunately, the reality of the impact the ABA policy might
have is far different from the glowing press accounts. First of all, the
ABA is a trade association that does not directly control the sale of
soda in schools. Rather, soda is sold to the schools through local
distributors who are controlled by the parent companies. There is
also no enforcement or oversight mechanism for the voluntary
policy. The ABA concedes that "the success of the policy is
dependent on voluntary implementation of it by individual beverage
companies and by school officials."' 172 The two major soda compa-
nies have even boasted that the policy mirrored their own, such as
Coca-Cola's written policy to not sell sodas in elementary schools.
73
Yet, as we have seen in the Kentucky Case Study, this policy is
already routinely violated. 1
74
168. Press Release, Am. Beverage Ass'n, Beverage Industry Announces
New School Vending Policy (Aug. 16, 2005), http://www.ameribev.org/press
room/2005_vending.asp.
169. Editorial, Soft Drink Industry Takes High Road, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Aug. 18, 2005, at .A 18 (The Atlanta Journal-Constitution is the hometown
paper of Coca-Cola).
170. Tom Paulson & Gregory Roberts, Schools Get Ally in Soda Issue: Drink
Makers, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 2005, http://seattlepi.nw
source.com/local/23688 l sodapop 17.html.
171. Child Health News, US. Beverage Industry Praised for Helping in
Childhood Obesity, NEWS-MEDICAL.NET, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.news-
medical.net/?id= 12549.
172. Press Release, Am. Beverage Ass'n, supra note 168.
173. See Betsy McKay, Soda Marketers Will Cut Back Sales to Schools,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2005, at B I (noting that "Coca-Cola ... had already
planned to sell only water and 100% juice to elementary schools" and was
engaging "in dialogue with [their] school customers to encourage them to
adopt the ABA policy"); Press Release, Pepsi-Cola, Pepsi-Cola North America
System Supports American Beverage Association's School Vending Policy
(Aug. 16, 2005), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=78265&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=743869&highlight =.
174. See supra Part II.D.
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The policy also applies only to vending machines, ignoring all
of the other ways that soda is sold in schools, such as in stores and at
sporting events. 'No explanation was offered by the ABA for the
policy's restriction to vending machines, a point that was largely
overlooked in the media coverage.
Also, in many cases, schools are locked into long term contracts.
This policy would only apply to new contracts, or "earlier if both
parties agree."' 175 But why would a soda company agree to change
an existing contract if it does not have to, and if doing so could hurt
it financially? If ABA members really cared about children's health,
why not call for an immediate renegotiation of all school contracts?
1. ABA's Non-Nutrition Policy
Even if the ABA policy could actually be implemented, from a
nutrition standpoint, the guidelines are feeble. As described by the
ABA, they provide for:
Elementary Schools: only water and 100 percent juice.
Middle Schools: only nutritious and/or lower calorie
beverages, such as water, 100 percent juice, sports drinks,
no-calorie soft drinks, and low-calorie juice drinks. No
full-calorie soft drinks or full-calorie juice drinks with five
percent or less juice until after school; and
High Schools: a variety of beverage choices, such as bottled
water, 100 percent juice, sports drinks, and juice drinks. No
more than 50 percent of the vending selections will be soft
drinks.
7 6
The policy, however, has a number of problems:
" Many school districts and states have much more
stringent policies and numerous school districts around
the nation have banned all soda and other highly
sweetened beverages, K-12.177
" Calling for the elimination of soda in elementary schools
is unimpressive when most soda is sold at the high
175. Press Release, Am. Beverage Ass'n, supra note 168.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Rosie Mestel, Too Much Pop, Too Little Nutrition, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at F1 (noting that "the Los Angeles Unified School
District already has banned the sale of sodas, certain sports drinks and fruit-
based sugar-sweetened drinks composed of less than 50% fruit juice").
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school level.
* Sports drinks are high in sugar and calories. The
strongest beverage policies in the nation do not allow
sports drinks at all.
78
* What kind of nutrition policy sets a cut-off at "five
percent or less juice?"
" Why not create a policy for only healthful beverages in
all schools?
Also, nutrition advocates who have fought for the nation's
toughest beverage policies say that a 50% soda and 50% more
healthful beverage policy simply does not work because kids will
always choose the soda.
John Weidman, with The Food Trust in Philadelphia, has been a
leader in that city's efforts to improve school food for several years.
He says the 50/50 policy is useless and will do nothing to solve the
problem.179 His city's school beverage policy for all grades is simply
water, 100% juice, and milk.'80 According to Jackie Domac, a
teacher at Venice High School, one problem with the 50/50 policy is
that the vendor sometimes replaces only the soda and not the more
healthful beverages when restocking.' In other words, they may
deliberately sabotage a 50/50 policy because they can make more
money by selling soda, which costs less to produce than juice.
"[T]hat's why even if they agree to put some juice in the machines, it
will be the last slot, or the juice and water machine will be far
removed from the common eating area," Domac says.' 82 "At Venice
High School, they made 15 cents on every juice sold versus 37 cents
on every soda. So, more than double the profit from the soda. So
even if it's their own product, you think they must want to sell it.
They don't. They have no interest in selling the juice."'
183
178. See, e.g., Nutrition Policy and Guidelines-Vending Machines, A La
Carte and Competitive Foods, SUPERINTENDENT'S CIRCULAR (Focus on
Children, Boston Public Schools, Boston, Mass.), Sept. 1, 2005, at 3, available
at http://bostonkl 2.ma.us/dept/docs/FNS-3.doc.
179. Telephone Interview with John Weidman, Senior Associate, The Food
Trust, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Aug. 24, 2005).
180. Id.
181. Telephone Interview with Jacqueline Domac, Health Teacher, Venice
High School, in Venice, Cal. (Aug. 23, 2004).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Domac says that she tried to implement a half juice and half
soda policy, but that Coca-Cola "totally manipulated the envi-
ronment. The juices were put further away in the cafeteria. The
juice would sell out and wouldn't get restocked ... whereas the soda
got restocked right away. Or, the juice would be at the bottom."'
184
The healthiest products are stocked at the bottom of the machines,
not at eye level, "so you are always going to see the soda first."'
' 85
Domac recalls, "One time I went to look, after not paying attention
for a few weeks, and the healthy beverage slots had been reduced to
only four out of 200 vending machine slots. So there is really no
incentive" to stock the more healthful products. 1
86
Another problem with the ABA policy is that it is voluntary and
depends on the cooperation of local vendors. Many vendors have
already proven that they are unwilling to work with schools to give
them the products they want. Domac says that it was always a
struggle with Coca-Cola as the vendor:
These people do not work with the districts unless push
comes to shove and you put your foot down. We tried to
work with them. We wanted all juices and water. And they
only brought orange juice and apple juice. They said no
other new juices were coming. [Instead] they brought some
disgusting soda with five percent milk. And they thought
that was healthy. Finally we said, 'no, you're going to have
to leave.' And then to sabotage the transition, they left so
slowly, leaving machines empty, so we couldn't put our
new machines in with our new vendor ... Now, they are
slowly changing, but only because they have to. 1
87
2. ABA's True Motivation: Deflect Further Legislative Action
The ABA's true purpose in issuing this policy is to deflect the
ongoing efforts of state legislators to address the problem. Every
time another attempt by a state legislature to pass a bill that limits
soda in school is covered in the news, it creates a public relations
problem for the industry. But if the companies are perceived as
"being responsive" then lawmakers might take the issue off the
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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table. 188 Indeed, some of the media coverage even referred to the
policy as representing a "reversal" in the ABA members' previous
efforts at fighting state legislation. 8 9 While the ABA did say their
policy would not replace any existing regulations, 190 which by law it
could not, no mention was made whatsoever of the ABA or its
members halting any of its lobbying activities.
The ABA even went so far as to get quotes for its press release
from three politicians-an adept public relations move-to "prove"
that lawmakers back the move. The three politicians were North
Carolina Lieutenant Governor Beverly Perdue, California
Assemblywoman Gloria Negrete McLeod, and Georgia Senator
Renee Unterman. 191 Curiously, the new ABA policy would have no
impact in North Carolina as that state had passed a bill only a month
earlier that almost mirrored the new ABA policy. 192 In California, a
stronger law is already on the books, and the state's largest school
districts have even stronger policies in place. 193 Finally, with Coca-
Cola headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, lawmakers from that state
have traditionally been loathed to pass any school vending bill. For
example, former -Georgia Senator Zell Miller, who has been called
188. Even some industry observers made this point. See Elliot Maras,
Beverage Industry 'Group Supports Limiting Carbonated Soda In Schools,
VENDING MARKET WATCH, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.amonline.com/article/
article.jsp?id=14379&siteSection=l (as noted by the editor, "This new policy
is clearly designed to counteract criticism from consumer activists and
politicians who say the beverage industry is profiting at childrens' (sic)
expense.").
189. See Editorial, supra note 169 ("The announcement this week by the
American Beverage Association represents a reversal by the industry, which
had been fighting legislative efforts to ban soft drinks from school vending
machines.").
190. See Press Release, Am. Beverage Ass'n, supra note 168 ("The policy
will not supersede federal, state and local regulations already in place.").
191. 1d.
192. See Associated Press, N.C. Lawmakers Give Final OK to School
Vending Machine Rules, (July 27, 2005), http://www.myrtlebeach
online.com/mld/myrtlebeachonline/1 2238685.htm.
193. California law does not allow soda in elementary and middle schools.
See CAL. EDUC. CODE tit. 2, § 49431.5 (2005). California also recently
enacted legislation that will reduce the sales of, and ultimately remove, sodas
from high schools. S.B. 965, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (enacted
Sept. 7, 2005). Major cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco do not
allow the sale of sodas in grades K-12. See Jean Merl, Students Learn to
Dispense with Sodas, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at Al.
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the "Senator from Coca-Cola," shut down a Senate Agriculture
Committee staff discussion of a ban on soda in high schools. 1
94
What better evidence of the new policy being no more than a
publicity stunt than the ABA's multimillion dollar plan "to run print
and broadcast advertising to educate the public about the new
policy."' 195 If this policy was truly reflective of a desire to be "part of
the solution" to childhood obesity, why would the ABA need to
advertise about it? Wouldn't actually making improvements in
schools be reward enough? What possible purpose could an ad cam-
paign serve, other than to promote soda companies as caring,
responsible corporate citizens? If this sounds eerily familiar, it
should. The ABA is taking a page right out of the tobacco industry's
playbook, which is to spend more money advertising its so-called
new responsible image than on actually being responsible.
196
IV. DECEPTIVE PROMOTION OF HEALTH AND NUTRITION
In addition to their lobbying efforts, food companies have
proven they cannot be trusted by promoting their products as
healthful, when in fact they are not. Food and beverage companies
have been facing increasing criticism for promoting unhealthful
products to children. One of industry's main strategies for respond-
ing to this public criticism has been to position themselves as part of
the solution by reformulating foods, selectively labeling foods, and
claiming to improve marketing policies. This Part describes the
ways that these tactics operate specifically with food products aimed
at children.
A. Kraft Foods: Industry Leader in Sales and Deception
When it comes to assessing food companies and their public
image, Kraft Foods stands out. First of all, the company bears the
dubious distinction of being owned by Altria, the company formerly
known as Philip Morris. 197 Kraft is also the largest food company in
194. Gary Ruskin & Juliet Schor, Junk Food Nation: Who's to Blame for
Childhood Obesity?, NATION, Aug. 29, 2005, at 15.
195. Press Release, Am. Beverage Ass'n, supra note 168.
196. See, e.g., Tom Price, Philip Morris Changes Its Name But Not Its
Tactics, CORPWATCH, Mar. 14, 2002, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?
id=2035 (discussing the company's failed $250 million campaign to improve
its corporate image)'
197. Numerous experts criticized the name change as nothing more than an
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North America and the second largest in the world, with products in
155 countries and net revenues in 2004 of $32 billion.' 98 There are
more than fifty Kraft brands worth $100 million and five worth $1
billion. 199 Kraft makes familiar household brands in just about every
food category, including cheese, cookies, crackers, coffee, candy,
cold cuts, cereals, frozen meals, sauces, and condiments. Walk down
any grocery store aisle and you are sure to pass a Kraft product. So
when Kraft makes a move, people pay attention.
Kraft's tobacco connections should make the public and media
especially skeptical when it comes to evaluating the company's
claims at being a good corporate citizen. For example, Philip Morris
wrote the book on professing to market responsibly when it comes to
teens and smoking. 20 0 And yet, Kraft enjoys a relatively squeaky
clean reputation and is often referred to as an industry leader on
making positive changes in its products and marketing policies.
Upon closer inspection, however, Kraft's attempts to position itself
as responsible are nothing more than a public relations ploy.
1. Kraft's Meaningless Advertising Policy
In January of 2005, Kraft promised to scale back junk-food ads
to children, a move that earned the much free, positive press. But the
potential impact of Kraft's promises is unclear. For example, only
certain products-including regular Kool-Aid, Oreo cookies, several
Post children's cereals, and some varieties of Lunchables-will no
longer be advertised to children ages six to eleven. However,
according to Kraft's press release, "products that the company will
continue to advertise in media aimed specifically at the 6-11 age
group include: Sugar-Free Kool-Aid beverages, Lunchables Fun
attempt at reinventing itself and hiding from the tobacco connection. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Infact, New Study Exposes Truth Behind Phillip Morris Name
Change (Mar. 27, 2003), http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/cms/page1224
.cfn (citing Elizabeth A. Smith & Ruth Malone, Altria Means Tobacco. Philip
Morris's Identity Crisis, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 553, 553 (2003)) (In fact now
known as Corporate Accountability International).
198. Kraft Foods, Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.kraft.com/profile/fact
sheet.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Youth Smoking Prevention, http://www
.philipmorrisusa.com/en/policies-practices/yspasp?surce=home-link (last
visited Nov. 12, 2005).
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Pack Chicken Dunks and 1/2 the Sugar Fruity Pebbles cereal."'2°
Kraft claims that these products offer "beneficial nutrients or a
functional benefit," and are part of its new "Sensible Solution"
program, a self-defined labeling program.
20 2
Why does Kraft get to define what is and isn't healthful? Is
sugar-free Kool-Aid healthful just because Kraft says so? Does
adding a little vitamin C (5.6 mg per serving) to an artificially
colored and artificially sweetened drink really make it "better-for-
you"? Sugar-free Kool-Aid substitutes sugar with the highly
controversial artificial sweetener aspartame, which has been linked
to numerous health problems, including seizures, migraines, and
brain tumors.
20 3
Other products aimed at kids that bear the "Sensible Solution"
flag include Reduced Fat Chips Ahoy! and Fruity Pebbles with 50%
less sugar.20 4 Making a product lower in fat or sugar does not make
it nutritious for the same reason that adding whole grain to Cocoa
Puffs does not make that product healthful.
Another problem with industry announcements of improved
policy is that there is no accountability. Even if Kraft's new policy
is a good thing, who is making sure they stick to it? What if the
company changes course next week? Also, the Kraft press release
says that the company "will continue to advertise its full portfolio of
products in television, radio and print media seen principally by
parents and all-family audiences ... [and] market its products
through means such as packaging, websites and in-store
promotion." 205  In other words, Kraft will simply transfer its
advertising to other media. But those details never got reported in
the media.
Countless newspaper stories continue to erroneously report that
Kraft has "stopped marketing unhealthy food to kids," or words to
that effect, when the details of their policy are nowhere near that
201. Press Release, Kraft Foods, Kraft Foods Announces Marketing Changes
to Emphasize More Nutritious Products (Jan. 12, 2005), http://www.kraft
.com/newsroom/01122005.html.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Dani Veracity, Aspartame Promotes Grand Mal Seizures, Say
Health Experts, NEWS TARGET, June 27, 2005, http://www.newstarget.com/
008952.html.
204. Press Release, Kraft Foods, supra note 201.
205. Id.
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sweeping. 2 06 This is exactly what Kraft was counting on: that lazy
reporters would perpetuate a shorthand way of referring to the policy
that makes it sound much better than it is; that's when the public
relations strategy has succeeded in achieving its goal.
2. Kraft's Self-Serving and Dubious School Policy
With all the focus on getting junk food out of schools, Kraft has
made sure to show how great a corporate citizen it is when it comes
to their school policy as well. The company claims to have
eliminated all in-school marketing. 20 7 Yet, Kraft still sells products
in schools. That the company does not hide this twisted logic makes
it all the more remarkable. Specifically, Kraft states:
Kraft has eliminated advertising and promotion in schools
around the world. This includes print and broadcast
advertising, contests, posters, book covers, product
sampling and any other forms of commercial messaging in
schools. Kraft-labeled products will continue to be sold in
schools.
20 8
It is disingenuous to promise to stop in-school promotion but
still sell products in school. How can the sale of food not count as
promotion? If you asked most nutritionists which is worse, the sale
of unhealthful food products to kids or the advertising of them, the
answer would be obvious. What if you walked into a school store
and measured the amount of square footage taken up by all the
packaged foods such as Kraft's ubiquitous cookie brands? Food
packaging is designed by highly-skilled marketing experts. That
should count as advertising and promotion.
Instead of eliminating their sale, Kraft has set specific nutrition
criteria for products sold in school vending machines.209 But how
206. See, e.g., Delroy Alexander & John Schmeltzer, Kraft to Stop
Advertising Its Sugary Snacks to Kids, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2005, at Cl;
Maryanna Lewyckyj, Kraft Kools to Ads For Kids, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 13,
2005, at 22; Caroline E. Mayer, Kraft to Curb Snack-Food Advertising, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at EO1.
207. See Kraft.com, Healthy Living Policies and Practices-Marketing
Practices, http://www.164.109.46.215/responsibility/nhwmarketingpractices
.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
208. Id.
209. See Kraft.com, Obesity Initiatives, http://164.109.46.215/obesity/res
ponses.html (last vigited Sept. 25, 2005).
204
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exactly is Kraft being held accountable to its guidelines? In schools
that participate in federal meals programs, specific nutrition criteria
must be met and schools are monitored (albeit inadequately) and held
accountable when their meals do not conform to government
standards. 210  However, for Kraft's policy regarding nutrition
standards on its food sold in schools, no similar system of
accountability is even possible. Indeed, Kraft itself admits the
challenge of being held to its own standards:
Food companies like Kraft often do not service vending
machines directly. Our products are sold to distributors and
operators, who, in turn, make decisions on which products
will be placed in which machines. Kraft can do its best to
work with the vending industry and school authorities to
encourage them to follow our recommendations, but we
will not have final control over those decisions.
21'
Moreover, Kraft admits its own skepticism about school vending
concerns:
As with in-school marketing, many interest groups and
individuals have expressed concerns about the charac-
teristics of products sold through vending machines in
schools. While for most children it's unlikely that products
sold through school vending machines account for a
significant portion of their total caloric intake, we
nonetheless recognize how contentious the debate over
school vending has become.
212
In other words, Kraft really does not think there is any problem
with selling unhealthful products in schools. However, since it has
become a political hot potato, they are going to make it look good by
claiming to no longer market in schools and by saying they have
placed a few nutritional standards on the foods they sell.
Looking at the nutrition criteria that Kraft is employing
illustrates why we cannot allow food companies to set their own
standards. According to its Web site, Kraft's guidelines for school
vending allow foods with "35% or less of total calories from
210. See 7 C.F.R. § 210.10 (2005).
211. See Kraft.com, supra note 209.
212. Id.
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sugars. ' 213 However, in a joint report by two agencies of the United
Nations, the WHO and the FDA, international nutrition experts
recommend limiting sugar intake to less than 10% of calories.
214
Thus, Kraft is setting nutritional guidelines that allow children to eat
up to 3.5 times the amount of the acceptable sugar allowance.
Moreover, Kraft's guidelines exclude naturally occurring sugars215 so
that means they allow foods with up to 35% added sugars to be sold
in schools. Added sugars are what most nutritionists advise against;
even the relatively weak USDA Dietary Guidelines caution against
too many added sugars.
216
Also, Kraft's school vending guidelines say they promote
"inclusion, where practical, of fiber, whole grains, fruits, dairy and
vegetables., 21 7  These are the very foods that the 2005 Dietary
Guidelines for Americans emphasize because most people and
especially children are not eating enough of them.218  Yet, Kraft
decides when these foods might be sold in schools. Of course, it is
not practical to sell whole grains, such as cooked brown rice or
whole grain bread, or fresh fruits and vegetables through school
vending machines. So Kraft will just continue to sell highly
processed foods that are more practical for sale in schools because
those foods earn the highest profits.219
3. Kraft's Policy Omits Branding and Advergaming
Brand licensing is a huge part of corporate marketing and
Kraft's policy-both on advertising and in schools-conveniently
side steps this aspect altogether. For example, on ToysRUs.com, you
can buy a "Dale Earnhardt, Jr. Oreo Monte Carlo Model Kit."220 The
213. See Kraft Marketing Practices, supra note 207.
214. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], DIET, NUTRITION AND THE PREVENTION
OF CHRONIC DISEASES, 56-57 WHO Rpt. 916 (2003), available at http://www
.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/who-fao-expertreport.pdf.
215. Kraft.com, supra note 207.
216. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS
2005: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION
(2005), available at http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/
recommendations.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005)[hereinafter DIETARY
GUIDELINES].
217. Kraft.com, supra note 207.
218. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 216.
219. See NESTLE, supra note 60, at 17-20.
220. The Dale Earnhardt, Jr. Oreo Monte Carlo Model Kit can be found on
206
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toy car is plastered with the Oreo logo design. The "skill level" is
for ages ten and up, and the safety warning says it is not suitable for
children under age eight. 221 By either criterion, this would violate
Kraft's policy of not marketing unhealthy food to kids aged six to
eleven.
You can also purchase a "Nascar Die Cast and Plastic Vehicle:
D. Earnhardt Jr. Ritz/Oreo," which is recommended for kids aged
four and up. 222 While this may not technically violate Kraft's policy
of not advertising to children under age six, because the policy is
limited to ads in "television, radio and print,' 223 it certainly appears
to violate the spirit of the company's stated policy (which is clearly
designed to make Kraft sound responsible when it comes to young
children).
The same goes for "Fisher-Price Games: Oreo Matchin'
Middles," for kids aged three to seven.224 This is the manufacturer's
description of the game:
A classic matching game with familiar Oreo cookie theme.
Oreo cookie toys pull apart to reveal shapes on top and
bottom halves. Two levels of play let beginners and more
advanced players reach into the cookie jar to grab their
cookie half. Once players find a match, they snap their
cookies together and stack 'em up nearby. The one with the
highest stack at the end wins. Oreo Matchin' Middles is
tons of fun for everyone.
225
While this game does not involve eating real cookies, it does
result in increased familiarity with Oreo's products, which is the
whole point. Plus, the object of the game is to stack up the most
shop.com, Dale Earnhardt 01 Goodwrench Monte Carlo Model Kit by Revell,
http://www.shop.com/op/aprod-p29905426-k24-g4-dale+earnhardt+oreo
+monte+carlo+model+kit-nover?sourceid=3 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
221. Id.
222. See Amazon.com, Toys & Games, 1:43 Scale NASCAR Die Cast and
Plastic Vehicle: D. Earnhardt Jr. Ritz/Oreo, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obi
dos/ASIN/B000096R3F/ref=pdsxpelt_11/002-2963593-3324044 (last visited
Oct. 6, 2005).
223. Press Release, Kraft Foods, supra note 201.
224. See Amazon.com, Toys & Games, Fisher-Price Games: Oreo Matchin'
Middles, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/BO0000J 161/qid= 11
22412806/sr=l-2/ref=sr_1_2/002-6325134-9009658?v-glance&s--toys (last
visited Oct. 6, 2005).
225. Id.
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number of cookies, which can be interpreted as encouraging over-
consumption.
Another key form of marketing to children is advertising via
Web sites with free video games, also known as "advergaming."
While the January 2005 policy announcement omits any mention of
Web sites, later, Kraft decided to include them. In September 2005,
Kraft announced the following:
By the end of 2006, only products that meet Kraft's
Sensible Solution nutrition standards will appear on Kraft
websites that primarily reach children ages 6-11. This
strengthens earlier marketing policy changes, including
advertising only "Sensible Solution" products in TV, radio
and print media primarily viewed by children ages 6-1 1.226
Kraft's CEO, Roger Deromedi, made this big announcement
himself at California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's Summit on
Health, Nutrition and Obesity. 227 Doing so earned Kraft entry into
the govemor's "Honor Roll" of companies making significant
"commitments" to solving obesity, thus providing the company with
abundant free public relations.
228
But why wait until the end of 2006? According to Mark Berlind,
Kraft's executive vice president for Global Corporate Affairs, the
company needs the time to make the Web changes and develop more
"Sensible Solutions" products aimed at kids.229 Meantime, Kraft will
continue to host such Web sites as "NabiscoWorld" where kids can
play numerous advergames featuring kids' products such as Oreos,
Chips Ahoy, and Oreo- and Chips Ahoy-flavored Jell-O Pudding
226. Press Release, Kraft Foods, Kraft Announces Healthy Lifestyle
Initiatives at California Summit on Health, Nutrition and Obesity (Sept. 15
2005), http://www.kraft.com/newsroom/09152005.html.
227. Id.
228. The event was heavily covered by the media, including the New York
Times. See Melanie Warner, Kraft Introduces 2 Somewhat Healthier Cookies
Made of Whole Grains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at C3. Kraft's CEO also
had a coveted spot on a panel of "Leaders of Change" at the event. Get
Healthy California, Governor's Summit on Health, Nutrition and Obesity,
Agenda (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/cwh/PDFs
/SummitGHC
_agenda.pdf.
229. Interview with Mark Berlind, Executive Vice President, Global
Corporate Affairs, Kraft Foods, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 15, 2005).
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Sticks.230
Another Kraft Web site, Postopia.com, is chock-full of games
aimed at young children, including those that promote Kool-Aid (not
the sugar-free variety), every Post kids' cereal (also not the reduced-
sugar kind), Oreos, and more. 231 If Kraft really cares about children,
why not take down these sites altogether until the company can
develop more healthful products?
In addition, the Web site policy is limited in that it only applies
to product promotion. On the main Kraft Web site, there is a link to
the "Kool-Aid Man's House," where young children are encouraged
to gather points to buy "stuff" such as the Kool-Aid Man Plush Toy
and the Kool-Aid Kite.232 Kraft's policy does not address this type
of branded marketing because it is not promoting a food product, per
se.
Finally, Kraft products for kids are tied into numerous kid-
friendly characters such as Batman, the Flintstones, the Hulk, and
many Disney characters. 233 If Kraft really cares about children's
health, then why not have a policy to stop using children's favorite
icons to promote unhealthy foods?
34
Also, Kraft's marketing policy regarding Web sites will not
change this strategy since the characters can still adorn "Sensible
Solution" products. Psychologist Susan Linn says that using cartoon
characters to sell any food to children is harmful because it teaches
them to choose food for what's on the package, as opposed to its
nutritional value or even taste.
235
230. See NabiscoWorld.com, Games, http://www.nabiscoworld.com/games/
default.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
231. See Postopia.com, Games, http://www.postopia.com/games/index.aspx
(last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
232. See Kool Aid Stuff, http://www.kraftfoods.com/koolaid/2001/kaall_
stuff.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
233. See, e.g., Press Release, Universal Picture, Universal Announces
Incredible Hulk Promo Program!, http://www.comicbookmovie.com/news/
Articles/89.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). For other examples of this type of
cross promotion, see Postopia.com, supra note 231.
234. See Angela Campbell, Restricting the Marketing of Junk Food to
Children by Product Placement and Character Selling, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
449 (2006); see also COMM. ON PREVENTION OF OBESITY IN CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, INST. OF MED., FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH:
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? (J. Michael McGinnis, et al. eds., 2006).
235. E-mail from Susan Linn, Ed.D, Instructor in Psychiatry, Harvard
Medical School, to author (Mar. 20, 2005, 18:49 EST) (on file with author).
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4. Hypocrisy Exposed: Fighting for Their Right to Advertise
Less than two weeks after its announcement of improved mar-
keting practices aimed at children, Kraft turned right around to join
with other major food companies and ad agencies to create a new
lobbying group called, the Alliance for American Advertising.
236
Kraft, and fellow members General Mills237 and Kellogg comprise
the top three advertisers of packaged food to kids with combined
annual spending on kids' ads of close to $380 million in the U.S.
alone.
Other alliance founders include the American Association of
Advertising Agencies and the Grocery Manufacturers Association
(GMA), two powerful trade associations in their own right. The
alliance's stated purpose is to defend the industry's First Amendment
rights to advertise to children and to promote self-regulation as an
alternative to government restrictions.
2A
Susan Linn, author of Consuming Kids and instructor in
psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, is appalled at this industry
power grab.
Marketing to children is not an absolute right. Food
companies and the advertising industry should be thinking
about their responsibilities to children, not about
their 'right' to exploit them. Whether we rely on research
or common sense, we know that children are more
vulnerable to marketing than adults and that they should be
protected because of their vulnerabilities.239
What better evidence do we need that "industry leaders" such as
Kraft cannot be trusted to self-regulate than their forming such a
lobbying coalition? If Kraft was serious about "being part of the
solution," why would this be necessary?
236. See Sarah Ellison, Divided, Companies Fight For Right to Plug Kids'
Food, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at B 1.
237. When I interviewed the General Mill's spokesperson, she refused to
comment on the company's involvement in this Alliance.
238. See Ellison, supra note 236. The Coalition quickly sought to increase
its membership, and PepsiCo was among the first to join. Wendy Melillo, Ad
Group and Food Company Alliance Grows, MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 31, 2005, http:/
/www.mediaweek.con/mw/search/article-displya.jsp?vnucontentid= 100077
9661.
239. E-mail from Susan Linn, supra note 235.
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B. Coca-Cola's Public Statements: Not the Real Thing
In the sweetened beverage category, Coca-Cola is the recog-
nized major player. According to its Web site, the company "is the
world's leading manufacturer, marketer, and distributor of
nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups, used to produce
nearly 400 beverage brands ... with local operations in over 200
countries around' the world. 240 Coke also easily wins the prize for
the beverage company that makes the most deceptive statements.
And they are often quite brazen about it.
1. Coca-Cola's Misleading Marketing Policy
Coca-Cola claims to not market its products to children under
age twelve. Specifically, official corporate policy states:
1) In keeping with a policy that has been in place for more
than half a century, The Coca-Cola Company and its
local bottling partners do not aim or direct any marketing
activity from any source to children under the age of
12.241
2) Marketing or advertising for products bearing trademarks
owned by The Coca-Cola Company, such as clothing,
toys, novelties and collectibles, are subject to these same
guidelines.
242
3) We will not promote our brands to children under 12 in
schools and will respect their classroom as a commer-
cial-free zone.
243
Yet the company violates this policy in numerous ways. For
example:
* Coke-branded toys including checker sets and cars aimed
at children as young as age four;
244
240. Coca-Cola.com, http://www.coca-cola.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
Oddly, the number of countries in the world by most accounts is only 193.
See, e.g., About.com, The Number of Countries in the World, http://geography.
about.com/cs/countries/a/numbercountries.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
241. Press Release, The Coca-Cola Company, The Coca-Cola Company's
New Global Advertising and Promotion Policy for Children (July 15, 2003),
http://www.coca-colahbc.com/cms/view.php?dir_pk=1 0&cms_pk
=256.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Josh Golin, Program Manager, Campaign for a Commercial Free
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" Television product placement, such as on American Idol,
a top-rated show for children ages 2-11 ;245
* Promotional tie-ins, such as sponsoring the Harry Potter
movies and other popular children's media.
2 46
Most importantly, Coca-Cola aggressively markets its products
in schools to children of all ages, through exclusive "pouring rights"
contracts. 4 7 The company often points to its model guidelines for
such school "partnerships," which recommend that soda not be sold
in elementary school, but allows sales in middle and high schools.
248
The policy also states that "beverage companies should be
responsive and respectful of each school's choice of beverages."
249
However, the guidelines have no enforcement mechanism. Who
is making sure that the policy is carried out in every single school
district? It is easy for Coca-Cola to make "policy" that in reality has
no impact on local bottlers. The result is good PR for the brand, but
no effect on the ground. Moreover, the policy permits the marketing
of sugar-laden "sports drinks" to younger children, as well as the use
of the Coca-Cola logo on school materials, including those
promoting health and nutrition education.
2 50
2. Coca-Cola's Deceptive Statements on School Policy
At the FTC workshop on marketing and childhood obesity in
July 2005, Abigail Rodgers, Coca-Cola vice president of Well
Strategies and Communication, made several misleading statements
regarding the company's school policy. For example, she said, "In
elementary schools, we do not sell carbonated soft drinks. In middle
schools and high schools, over half of what we sell are zero-calorie
beverages and non-carbonated beverages."
251
Childhood, Statement at the Coca-Cola Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Apr.
19, 2005), http://www.commercialexploitation.com/actions/cokesharesholder
statement.htm.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
248. COCA-COLA COMPANY, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR SCHOOL BEVERAGE
PARTNERSHIPS 3 (2001), available at http://www2.coca-cola.com/ourcompany
/halschoolbeverageguidelines.pdf.
249. Id. at 2.
250. See Rhea R.' Borja, Coca-Cola Plays Both Sides of School Marketing
Game, EDUC. WK., Nov. 5, 2003, at 8.
251. Abigail Rodgers, Vice President, Well Strategies and Commc'n, Coca-
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A survey of Kentucky schools revealed that soda is sold in 44%
of elementary schools.2 5 2 Coca-Cola was also a powerful lobbying
force against four legislative attempts to pass a state bill to get soda
out Kentucky schools, including elementary schools.25 3 Ms. Rodgers
forgot to mention this and other state bills Coca-Cola has helped kill
or weaken, including bills in California, New Mexico, Arizona,
Connecticut, Indiana and Oregon, just to name a few.
254
Also, a 2003 survey of Texas schools revealed that 63% of
districts with exclusive vending contracts have deals with Coca-Cola,
and such arrangements do include elementary schools.255
Next, a 2004 survey conducted by the Center for Science in the
Public Interest of 1,420 vending machines in 251 schools in 24
states, grades 7-12, found that 70% of the options were sugary
drinks such as soda,juice drinks (with less than 50% juice), iced tea,
and sports drinks.25 a Moreover, 86% of the soda was regular and
only 14% of the sodas were diet.
2 7
Ms. Rodgers' statement was obviously meant to convey the
impression that Coca-Cola sells mostly healthful products in middle
and high schools. However, CSPI's data makes her statement highly
suspect. In addition, just because a beverage is "zero-calorie" or
"non-carbonated," that does not automatically make it healthful.
Many of Coca-Cola's "fruit drinks," for example, are still very high
in sugar and many others contain artificial sweeteners that bear no
resemblance to actual fruit.
25 8
Cola Company, Remarks at the FTC Workshop, Perspectives on Marketing,
Self-Regulation and Childhood Obesity 151 (July 14-15, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Foodmarketingtokids/transcript
_050714.pdf).
252. See Crystal Harden, School Food May Go on Diet, KY. POST, Mar. 12,
2002, http://www.kypost.com/2002/mar/12/junk03I202.html (online edition).
253. See discussion on lobbying efforts in Kentucky, supra Part II.D.
254. See supra Part II.
255. FOOD AND NUTRITION DIv., TEX. DEPT. OF AGRIC., SCHOOL DISTRICT
VENDING CONTRACT SURvEY, http://www.squaremeals.org/fn/render/channel/
items/0,1249,2348_2515_3649_0,00.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
256. CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, DISPENSING JUNK 4 (2004)
http://www.cspinet.org/dispensing~junk.pdf.
257. Id.
258. See MICHAEL F. JACOBSON, LIQUID CANDY: HOW SOFT DRINKS ARE
HARMING AMERICAN'S HEALTH 10 (2005), http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/
liquid candy final_w_new-supplement.pdf.
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Ms. Rodgers also made this statement at the FTC meeting:
Our data, because we've tried to understand what the
consumption habits are of full-calorie soft drinks in schools,
our data tells us that in high schools, kids are consuming a
couple ounces a day on average. So, it is not the kind of
extremes that we sometimes think it might be.
259
First of all, we are given no citation of the source of this data, so
there is no way to verify it. Next, other research defies the notion
that high school kids drink little soda. According to the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, for example, "[t]eenagers get 13
percent of their calories from carbonated and noncarbonated soft
drinks. '260 Furthermore, "[s]oda pop provides the average 12 to 19-
year-old boy with about 15 teaspoons of refined sugars a day and the
average girl with about 10 teaspoons a day." 261 Trying to obfuscate
the science is a tactic taken right out of the tobacco industry
playbook.
Finally, Ms. Rodgers made this statement at the same meeting:
"Vending machines are turned off, in many cases, during the school
day, but in all cases because of regulation in and around meal
times.
,262
The vague phrase "in many cases" cannot be verified, but
anyone who works in a school will tell you that soda machines are in
fact almost never turned off during the school day. The second part
of this statement is also false. Rodgers is referring to a U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture regulation that says soda may not be sold during
meal times.263 But, in fact, the rule says that soda may not be sold in
food service areas. 264 There is no restriction for sodas sold anywhere
else on school grounds, so Ms. Rodgers was giving the false
impression that no sodas are sold around meal times when the reality
is that kids simply purchase their sodas from the hallway vending
machines and bring them into the cafeteria, or from vending
machines in the cafeteria just before meal time and save them to have
259. Rodgers, supra note 251, at 196.
260. JACOBSON, supra note 258, at iv.
261. Id.
262. Rodgers, supra note 251, at 196.
263. USDA National School Lunch Program, Competitive Food Services,
7 C.F.R. § 210.1 l(b) (2005).
264. Id.
214
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with lunch. In addition, as many teachers and food service staff will
attest, this rule is frequently broken with soda vending contractors
turning a blind eye. 265 Finally, Rodgers gave the impression that the
rule applies in all schools everywhere, 266 but the regulation only
applies inxublic schools participating in the National School Lunch
Program.
3. Coca-Cola's Public Relations Disguised as Science
In 2004, Coca-Cola created a new entity called the "Beverage
Institute for Health & Wellness" to deflect mounting criticism.
268
According to its Web site:
The Beverage Institute for Health & Wellness is a research
organization within The Coca-Cola Company that supports
scientific research, education and outreach with a primary
focus on beverages. The Institute supports research that
increases understanding of the role that beverages can play
in diets and health, in developed and developing countries,
around the world.269
In reality, the Institute was formed to shape public opinion and
even the very science related to Coca-Cola's beverages. Since its
inception, the Institute has sponsored at least three separate academic
symposia related to nutrition and health, including:
1) The 2005 Harvard Medical School Postgraduate
Nutrition Symposium-The Childhood Obesit Epi-
demic: Predictors and Strategies for Prevention;
265. See Telephone Interview with Carolyn Dennis, supra note 66.
266. See Rodgers, supra note 251, at 196.
267. USDA National School Lunch Program, General Purpose and Scope, 7
C.F.R. § 210.1(b).
268. See Press Release, The Coca-Cola Co., Coca-Cola Unveils Plans for
Institute Dedicated to the Role of Beverages in Healthy Lifestyles
(Mar. 1, 2004), http://www2.coca-cola.com/presscenter/nr_20040220_
beverageshealthylifestyles.html; see also John N. Frank, Coca-Cola Plans
Institute to Study Health, Wellness, PR WEEK, Mar. 8, 2004, at 3.
269. The Beverage Institute for Health & Wellness, Mission and Scope,
http://www.thebeverageinstitute.org/mission-scope.shtml (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
270. The Beverage Institute for Health & Wellness, Symposiums,
http://www.thebeverageinstitute.org/symposiums.shtml (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
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2) The 2005 ADA Research Symposium at the 2005 Food
& Nutrition Conference & Expo: The Childhood Obesity
Epidemic: Predictors and Strategies for Prevention;
27 1
3) "Managing Sweetness" a conference presented by
Oldways Preservation Trust in Mexico City in
November, 2004.272
At the Oldways conference, journalists were offered free travel
and accommodations to attend the meeting.2 73  The conference
featured scientists and chefs talking about the role sugar plays in
proper diets.274 According to one account, "[t]he conference aim[ed]
to diffuse concerns that sugary foods are a culprit in America's
obesity epidemic., 275 Out of the meeting emerged such "scientific
consensus statements" as: "[glood health depends on wise manage-
ment of calories from all food and drink sources, coupled with wise
lifestyle choices that include regular exercise." 276 Sounds more like
food industry rhetoric than actual science. The very name of the
conference, "Managing Sweetness," was a good indication that any
consensus that emerged was not going to be negative about sugar.
Another example of Coca-Cola's attempt to manipulate science
occurred at the Harvard event on childhood obesity in March 2005.
There, Dr. Maxime Buyckx, Coca-Cola's director of nutrition and
health sciences, denied any scientific connection between soda and
obesity despite a Harvard study concluding that each additional soda
a child drinks a day increases their risk of obesity by sixty percent.
2 77
Buyckx claimed that the study was methodologically flawed and
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. John N. Frank, Oldways Gathering to Give Sugar Positive PR, PR
WEEK, Sept. 22, 2004, available at http://www.prweek.com/us/search/article/
222977/oldways-gathering-give-sugar-positive-pr.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Oldways Develops Tools for Consumers to Manage Sweetness and
Focus on the Total Diet Instead of 'Bits and Pieces,' PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 10,
2004, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/
www/story/1 1-10-2004/0002402326&EDATE-.
277. E-mail from Richard A. Daynard, Professor, Northeastern Univ. Sch. of
Law, to author (Mar. 19, 2005, 10:09:00 EST) (on file with author). For the
results of the study, see David S. Ludwig et al., Relationship Between
Consumption of Sugar-sweetened Drinks and Childhood Obesity, 357 LANCET
505, 505--08 (2001)'
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should merely be treated as hypothesis-generating.
278
Richard Daynard, professor at Northeastern University School
of Law and a long-time tobacco control advocate, was at the meeting
and later observed:
[Buyckx's statement] eerily echoed claims the tobacco
companies made... about the... studies [that] showed that
smoking causes lung cancer.. .they were all just
"hypothesis-generating!" The tobacco industry is currently
defending a racketeering suit brought by the Department of
Justice based [on] its decades-long campaign of scientific
denial and disinformation. Will Coke be next?
279
C. McDonald's Misleading Public Statements
When it comes to fast food giants, McDonald's-the largest
chain in the world-is an easy target. The company's mascot,
Ronald McDonald, is the most recognized character by children,
second only to Santa Claus.280 Faced with mounting criticism for
targeting children with its unhealthful products, McDonald's has
been engaged in an enormous public relations campaign in recent
months. Strategies include giving Ronald McDonald a makeover to
make him appear more active, 2  partnering with Oprah's fitness
guru Bob Greene,282 and placing health education curricula into
schools. 283 Another strategy is to make public statements about how
responsible the company is. Unfortunately, they don't always ring
true.
1. McDonald's Nutrition Labeling Deception
In addition to promoting legislation addressing school nutri-
278. E-mail from Richard A. Daynard, supra note 277.
279. Id.
280. See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 4 (2001).
281. Ronald McDonald Gets an Extreme Makeover, REUTERS, June 9, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8135239/.
282. See Press Release, McDonald's, McDonald's Offers a Sweetheart of a
Deal: Get Fit with Bob Greene For 60 Percent Less (Feb. 14, 2005),
http://www.mcdonalds.com/usa/news/current/conpr_02142005.html.
283. See Press Release, McDonald's, McDonald's Teams Up with Educators
and Health/Nutrition Experts to Promote Balanced, Active Lifestyles in
Schools (Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.primezone.com/newsroom/news.html?d
=84367.
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tion, another goal of nutrition advocates has been to require chain
restaurants to provide nutrition labeling on their menu boards, similar
to packaged food labeling requirements.28 4 But, this effort has also
been met with much resistance by the food industry. And yet, the
very companies fighting these bills try to make themselves look
responsible. For example, Michael Donahue, vice president, U.S.
Communications and Customer Satisfaction, McDonald's U.S.A,
made the following statement at the FTC meeting on marketing and
childhood obesity last summer: "Starting over 30 years ago, we
started with the first nutritional brochures and helped lead the
industry so that all of our competitors and others would do the same
,,285
The impression this statement is meant to convey is that the
company actually cares about sharing nutrition information with
customers, when nothing could be further from the truth. For the
past several years, consumer groups such as the Center for Science in
the Public Interest have been calling on "industry leaders," such as
McDonald's, to .provide nutrition information in the same place
where all other relevant information is posted for consumers-right
at the point of purchase, on their menu boards, rather than in
brochures or Web sites where customers are unlikely to see the
information.
28 6
Yet McDonald's has vigorously resisted any such change in its
policy. Maine's state representative, Sean Faircloth, has been an
active legislative proponent of menu labeling, among other nutrition
policies. He says that the brochures are designed for a strategic
purpose: "To create the appearance of accessible information,
without the reality of their use. They don't ask you, 'Do you want to
Supersize that' in a card or brochure on a table ... they ask you
284. The restaurant industry conveniently exempted itself from the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act, which was passed by Congress in 1990. See Pub.
L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1).
285. Michael Donahue, Vice President, U.S. Comm. & Customer
Satisfaction, McDonald's, Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation and
Childhood Obesity, Remarks at the FTC Workshop, 154 (July 14-15, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Foodmarketingto
kids/transcript_050714.pdf).
286. See Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Nutrition Labeling on
Menus/Menu Boards at Chain Restaurants, http://www.cspinet.org/nutrition
policy/policyoptions.html#NutritionLabeling (last visited Sept. 27, 2005).
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when you are buying the product...."
287
In Maine, McDonald's sent a lobbyist who is a former
Republican State Senator (and thus obviously well-connected) to
successfully defeat that state's bill. 288 Also McDonald's and all of its
thousands of franchises are members of the National Restaurant
Association, a powerful lobbying group that is fighting against both
national and state legislation to require such nutrition labeling on
menus and menu boards in chain restaurants.
28 9
2. McDonald's Targets Schools Despite Claims to the Contrary
Mr. Donahue also made this statement at the FTC meeting:
[T]here's a lot of controversy about the industry and
working with the schools. Ironically, it's often the schools
that approach us first, and they're so strapped for resources
and alternative programs for physical education and other
things ... It doesn't mean that we're not talking about the
menu choice and other issues, but it means that we have to
talk and work with these schools.
290
The statement that it is "often" schools that approach
McDonald's is impossible to verify and dubious. Even if it were
true, why would it mean that the company must "talk and work with
these schools?" If McDonald's really cared about children's health,
why couldn't the company just say, "Sorry, but we don't market in
schools because our food should really be aimed at parents so they
can have more control over what their children eat. Targeting
schoolchildren with cheeseburgers and French fries is just not our
287. Telephone Interview with Representative Sean Faircloth, Me., in
Bangor, Me. (Mar. 28, 2005).
288. Telephone Interview with Representative Sean Faircloth, Me., in
Bangor, Me. (July 9, 2004) (on file with author).
289. The National Restaurant Association Web site provides the current
status of pending legislation along with hyperlinks to local Restaurant
Association contacts for more information. Nat'l Restaurant Ass'n, Obesity,
State Menu Labeling Legislation, http://www.restaurant.org/govermment/state/
nutrition/bills labeling.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). The Web site also
opposes the federal version of the menu labeling requirement, the Menu
Education and Labeling Act (MEAL), which has gone nowhere since first
being introduced in 2003 as a result of industry lobbying. National Restaurant
Association, Nutrition and Healthy Lifestyles, http://www.restaurant.org/
govemment/issues/issue.cfm?Issue=nutrition (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
290. Donahue, supra note 285, at 185-86.
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policy." They could not say that because it would not be good busi-
ness. But it is not, as Mr. Donahue would have us believe, because
McDonald's is trying to help schools out of financial trouble and
they have no other choice.
If schools themselves are approaching McDonald's, why does
the company promote its "fundraising" program called
"McTeacher's Night" so heavily? The way this "program" works is
that teachers volunteer to work for a few hours behind the counter at
an area McDonald's and the company donates twenty percent of the
proceeds to the school. 291  The result is heavy promotion of
McDonald's food, as students and their parents are encouraged and
expected to dine there that evening (for the school's sake, of course).
What kind of message does this send to children-to have the
adults they look up to all day long working behind the counter, often
contradicting the nutrition education they receive in the classroom?
In many cities, the program has been controversial and teachers have
resisted participation. 292 For example, in San Francisco, several
elementary school teachers had this to say about the program:
" "We will be endorsing a product that contributes to the
epidemic of childhood obesity and heart disease."
293
" "This is exploiting teachers for a real, live McDonald's
commercial. 294
" "It's demeaning.
'" 295
Just last year, McDonald's approached the Evergreen School
District in Vancouver, Washington with this program. 296 Rafaela
Steen, an employee of the district was not happy about the idea, and
expressed her concerns to the elementary school principal who was
considering having his school participate (the school ultimately
decided against the idea.):
It does seem like such a manipulative way for McDonald's
to appear to be helping schools while at the same time
indoctrinating young children and families about
291. Meredith May, Teachers Sizzle Over Fast Food Fund-raiser, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 15, 2002, at Al.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. E-mail from Rafaela Steen, Employee, Evergreen Sch. Dist., Wash., to
author (Aug. 14, 2005, 16:01:00 PST) (on file with author).
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McDonald's and all that they represent. Who doesn't look
up to their teachers in some way, and to see them behind the
counter enthusiastically supporting McDonald's ... is quite
scary.
297
What a great deal for the company to get adults to volunteer to
work for them in exchange for a paltry donation. This is an obvious
public relations stunt. If McDonald's truly cared about schools, why
not donate the money outright?
3. Litigation Against McDonald's for Deceptive Practices
McDonald's has been the target of litigation at least three times
for deceptive behavior. The first case involved claims that the com-
pany's french fries were cooked in 100 percent vegetable oil when in
fact they were flavored with beef tallow.298 Several vegetarian and
Hindu groups sued and the case settled for $10 million and an
apology.
299
The second case involved McDonald's' promise to remove trans
fat from its cooking oil because of concerns that eating the fat
increases heart disease. 30 0 While McDonald's made the announce-
ment to much positive press in September 2002, promising that the
change would be made by February 2003, that never happened. 30 1 A
class action filed in California alleging consumer deception was
settled in 2005 for $8.5 million and promises that the company
would be clearer about its future plans to remove trans fats.
30 2
297. Id.
298. Andrew Buncombe, McDonald's Faces Payout Over Beef Fat on Its
Fries, INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 8, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/
headlines02/0308-02.htm.
299. Id. Most of the money was distributed to vegetarian and Hindu groups
for charitable and educational purposes, but not before a series of objections
were filed as fights broke out among vegetarian groups over the money. See
McDonald's Fries: Not Done Yet, HINDUISM TODAY, Oct.Dec. 2003, http://
www.hinduismtoday.com/archives/2003/10-12/66-67%2OMcDonald's.shtml.
300. See Press Release, Steven L. Joseph, President, BanTransFat.com,
Plaintiffs' Press Release on Settlement of McDonald's Trans Fat Litigation
(Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.bantransfat.com/mcdonalds.html.
301. Id.
302. Id. (indicating that $6 million would go to the American Heart
Association).
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Finally, the case that has gained the most notoriety is still
pending in New York.3 °3 That case involves two children who ate at
McDonald's regularly and are now suffering from diet-related health
problems such as obesity, high cholesterol and diabetes. 30 4 The class
action alleges the fast food giant misrepresented its products as
nutritious and did not reveal potential hazards.30 5  The named
plaintiffs father, Israel Bradley, said he never saw anything in the
restaurants that informed him of the food's ingredients.i06 "I always
believed McDonald's was healthy for my children," he said in an
affidavit.
30 7
The media spin about the McDonald's case was that it was
simply about getting fat from eating too much fast food. 30 8 But the
case is really based on deceptive advertising and how McDonald's
marketed its food as healthful. According to Ellen Fried, a Professor
of food law at New York University, people are missing the point
when they easily discount the case as being frivolous:
People have to go back to a couple of years ago, before all
the noise started. When people didn't even think of going
to McDonald's every day as being a problem. It was
advertised as healthful, perfectly okay to eat everyday and
Supersize it and eat more. So, you have to look at what
responsibility did McDonald's have to its customers.
Obviously, they can't lie or present information in a
deceptive way ... It's about what [McDonald's] told me
about eating this way, or didn't tell me.
30 9
303. Pelman v. McDonald's, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), was
dismissed in 2003 and was recently reinstated by the 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Mark Hamblett, Part of Parents' Obesity Suit Against
McDonalds Revived, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1106573726371.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Ellen Ruppel Shell, Are We Turning Our Children Into 'Fat'
Junkies?, OBSERVER (UK), Oct. 12, 2003, available at http://observer
.guardian.co.uk/foodmonthly/story/0,9950,1058656,00.html.
309. Telephone Interview with Ellen Fried, Adjunct Professor, New York
University (Feb. 28, 2005).
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While this widely misunderstood case remains the only one of
its kind filed anywhere in the nation, the corporate backlash has
resulted in a serious threat to consumers' ability to seek redress
through the court system. The restaurant industry and its allies have
been waging a lobbying campaign to get laws passed in all fifty
states to strip away plaintiffs' rights to sue a food company for
obesity or obesity-related diseases'.3 1 As of this writing, twenty-one
states have passed so-called "cheeseburger bills" and more bills are
pending, as is federal legislation.
31 1
These lawsuits have only alleged wrongdoing and, with two
cases having settled and the third still pending, no definitive court
judgment has yet to be made. However, the suits point to a pattern of
conduct that at least suggests we should be cautious about trusting
McDonald's to self-regulate effectively.
D. General Mills' Whole Grain Deception
When the federal government updated its Dietary Guidelines for
Americans in 2005, one of the recommendations was to emphasize
daily intake of whole grains.3 1 2 It was high time for the government
to explain the difference between processed white flour and the
nutritional benefits of eating whole grains found in foods such as
brown rice and whole wheat bread. The nation's "low-carb" craze
had needlessly made too many people carb-phobic when in reality,
they just needed to understand this distinction.3 13  Because the
Dietary Guidelines represent an authoritative statement from the
federal government about how to eat,314 food companies like to take
310. See Public Health Advocacy Institute, Protect Your Rights as a
Consumer from the Food Industry, http://phaionline.org/projects-legis.intro
.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
311. See National Restaurant Association, State Frivolous Lawsuit
Legislation, http://www.restaurant.org/goverment/state/nutrition/billslaw
suits.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005); Pub. Health Advocacy Inst., supra note
310. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill in October, but it still
faces a Senate vote. See Cheeseburger Bill Puts Bite into Lawsuits, CNN.COM,
Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/20/cheeseburger.bill/.
312. The guidelines are updated every five years. See DIETARY GUIDELINES,
supra note 216.
313. See Dean Omish, Was Dr. Atkins Right? 104 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N
537, 538 (2004).
314. Or at least they should. For how they are influenced by industry
interests, see NESTLE, supra note 60, at 126.
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advantage of them to tout their products.
Enter General Mills, a top seller of children's cereals with
annual sales of more than $1 billion.315 Just after the release of the
Dietary Guidelines in January 2005, General Mills reformulated its
cereals sold in the U.S. to contain whole grains and the boxes were
plastered with huge "Whole Grain" banners. 316 In April, with the
release of the food pyramid, General Mills placed the new image on
its cereal boxes as well.317 What about all those high-sugar cereals
aimed at kids? Mary Beth Thorsgaard, General Mills spokesperson
says, "Even with presweetened cereals, there really is no better
breakfast your kid could eat in the morning .. ..,,318 You have to
love the corporate-speak they train people to use. Using the passive
voice with the made-up word "pre-sweetened" makes is sound like
the added sugar somehow occurs naturally. And no better breakfast?
Compared to what? Starving?
Marion Nestle, Paulette Goddard Professor of Nutrition, Food
Studies, and Public Health at New York University and author of
Food Politics, responds:
It is hard not to react sarcastically to such statements from
cereal makers. I have heard them say that the reason sugary
cereals are good for kids is because of the milk [that's
added]. That, I suppose, would also be the rationale for
giving kids cookies for breakfast. This is a marketing ploy
to make people think that whole grain Cocoa Puffs are
healthy. Sugar is still the first ingredient.
319
315. GENERAL MILLS, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2005), http://www.generalmills.
com/corporate/investors/GeneralMillsAR2005.pdf.
316. See Kendall Powell, Executive Vice President, General Mills, Remarks
at the FTC Workshop, Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation
and Childhood Obesity, 145-46 (July 14-15, 2005) (transcript available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Foodmarketingtokids/transcript_050714.
pdf).
317. See General Mills, General Mills Announces Major Nutrition Education
Initiative in Conjunction With New Food Guide Pyramid (Apr. 19, 2005),
http://www.generalmills.com/corporate/healthwellness/in-the-newsdetail.as
px?itemlD= 10561 &catlD=7586&section=news.
318. Telephone Interview with Mary Beth Thorsgaard, Spokesperson,
General Mills (Mar. 14, 2005).
319. E-mail from Marion Nestle, Professor, New York University, to author
(March 14, 2005, 09:18 EST) (on file with author).
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Also, "[e]ach serving contains 26 grams of carbohydrate of
which 13 come from sugars, 1 gram of protein, and 1 gram of fiber,
for 120 calories, the equivalent of a small cookie. The net benefit is
one gram of fiber and that's not much benefit."
320
At the FTC meeting on marketing and childhood obesity last
summer, Kendall Powell, General Mills' executive vice president of
U.S. Retail, talked about how the company has "reformulated" all of
its cereals to contain whole grain. He said, "General Mills' whole
grain initiative will provide 26 million servings of whole grain per
day across the country and kids in America are going to get 12
million servings of whole grain thanks to these products."
32'
Such a statement is obviously meant to sound impressive from a
public health perspective. The average person hearing that might
think, "Wow, General Mills is really being a responsible corporate
citizen by providing Americans with all that healthful whole grain in
their cereals." But if you take a closer look, the statement becomes
less impressive and downright deceptive.
First of all, what does it mean that General Mills is "providing"
children with twelve million servings of whole grain per day?
Presumably, that figure is based on General Mills' projected sales,
but it would be impossible for any health researcher to verify the
data. Next, the statement leaves out any consideration of the
nutritional value of the rest of the cereal contents. Mr. Powell also
said that "obesity is about calories and cereal is a low-calorie way to
start the day." 322 But, nutrition is not just about calories; it is also
about the actual nutrients (or lack thereof) in the food.
General Mills likes to talk mostly about their Cheerios brands.
But, what Mr. Powell failed to mention is how General Mills also
sells the following cereals aimed at children: Whole Grain Reese's
Puffs, Whole Grain Cookie Crisps, Whole Grain Cocoa Puffs, Whole
Grain Lucky Charms, and Whole Grain Chocolate Lucky Charms.
323
Ingredients in Chocolate Lucky Charms include: whole grain oats,
sugar, canola oil, and marshmallows, which are made of sugar, corn
320. E-mail from Marion Nestle, Professor, New York University, to author
(Aug. 11, 2005, 10:31 EST) (on file with author).
321. See Powell, supra note 316, at 146.
322. Id. at 145.
323. See General Mills, Big G Cereals, http://www.generalmills.com/
corporate/brands/product.aspx?catlD=50# (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
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starch, corn syrup, dextrose, gelatin, two yellow dyes, blue dye, red
dye, and artificial flavor. 324 Thank goodness for the whole grain!
E. General Mills Campaign Flouts CARU Guidelines
In addition, for General Mills to present itself as a responsible
corporate citizen that cares about children flies in the face of their
campaign called "Choose Breakfast," which clearly violates chil-
dren's advertising guidelines. On June 22, 2005, General Mills
announced this new children's television advertising campaign in
order to "communicate the benefits of breakfast to children."
325
While General Mills attempts to cloak the campaign with public
service respectability by dubbing it "non-branded," the ten-second
spots are paired with twenty-second spots for the company's kid-
oriented cereals including Lucky Charms, Cocoa Puffs, and Trix.
326
Adding bang to its buck, the company's popular mascots such as the
Trix rabbit and Lucky Charms leprechaun will tout physical activity
on cereal boxes (presumably to work off all that sugar).
327
According to guidelines from the Children's Advertising
Review Unit (CARU) of the Council of Better Business Bureaus,
these ads are not supposed to appeal to a kid's sense of fantasy, for
example, where a bowlful of cereal transforms a child into a super-
strong, super-smart, superhero. 32  As noted previously by myself
and food law expert Ellen Fried:
[A]ll three of the General Mills spots depict that exact
scenario: a young girl who has eaten breakfast is able to
escape danger with lightening speed in contrast to a
sluggish non-breakfast eater; a young boy outruns and
324. Id. (click on Lucky Charms hyperlink for an image of the nutritional
values panel).
325. Press Release, General Mills, General Mills Launches New Children's
Advertising Initiative (May 22, 2005), http://www.generalmills.com/corp
orate/mediacenter/news-releasedetail.aspx?itemlD= 144&catlD=227.
326. Id.
327. See id. ("The advertising campaign will be supported with kid-friendly
health and fitness-related messaging on more than 300 million boxes of cereal
this year and on the company's Web site"); see also Janet Adamy, General
Mills Touts Sugary Cereal as Healthy Kids Breakfast, WALL ST. J., June 22,
2005, at B 1.
328. See CHILDREN'S ADVER. REVIEW UNIT, COUNCIL FOR BETTER Bus.
BUREAUS, SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN'S ADVERTISING 4
(2003), http://www.caru.org/guidelines/guidelines.pdf.
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outmaneuvers an adult thief and credits his breakfast; and
another young boy prepares to enter a boxing ring to face a
menacing adult opponent-but only after eating his
breakfast. Not coincidentally, all three spots depict
breakfast as including a nice big bowl of cereal.
With these ads being shown just prior to commercials for kids'
cereals, it does not take a great leap of logic to assume that kids will
associate these behaviors with eating General Mills brands cereal.
Children cannot possibly be expected to distinguish between a Trix
commercial and the "non-branded" PSA.
CARU should have taken swift action to banish the ads, but
instead, they joined hands with General Mills by anointing their
campaign. The company deftly sought pre-approval and got even
more. 330 Indeed, CARU director Elizabeth Lascoutx heaped praise
on General Mills. In a General Mills press release, she is quoted as
saying that "[e]nsuring that positive, non-branded health messages
like Choose Breakfast are being delivered to children is not only
responsible, but commendable.
'" 3 31
Either Lascoutx did not see the ads, did not know they were
being corrupted by General Mills' branded spots or is not familiar
with the guidelines of the agency she directs-none of which is
acceptable for an organization charged with protecting our children
from unscrupulous advertisers. 332 This cooperative effort between
the regulator and the regulated should be evidence enough of the
utter failure of self-regulation.
F Nickelodeon's Misleading Policy Statements
Food companies are not the only ones who cannot be trusted
when it comes to their public statements and policies. The cable
channel, Nickelodeon, is the recognized industry leader in children's
commercial television. As a result of public criticism for their role in
being an outlet for marketing of junk food to kids, they too have
gone on the defensive to claim they care about children's health and
329. Michele Simon & Ellen Fried, Kids Cereal Maker Flouts Ad Rules,
(June 25, 2005), http://www.informedeating.org/Kids%20Cereal%2Maker/
20Flouts%20Ad%20Rules.html.
330. Id.
331. Press Release, General Mills, supra note 325.
332. Simon & Fried, supra note 329.
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well-being. But their actions also speak louder than words.
At the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) Committee on Food
Marketing and the Diets and Children and Youth workshop in
January 2005, Marva Smalls, executive vice president of
Nickelodeon, made several noteworthy comments. 333 For example,
she said, "Most advertisers religiously adhere to the guidelines set by
... CARU. We would know. We're part of CARU and sit on the
board. 3 34 This 9tatement has been disputed by other commentators,
and is an exaggeration at best.335 Also, the fact that a major chil-
dren's television channel is represented on the board of the very
organization charged with monitoring its practices only furthers the
point that CARU is the fox guarding the henhouse.
Ms. Smalls also claimed that Nickelodeon's own policy goes
beyond that of CARU in the following ways:
1) Advertisements should not encourage or condone
excessive consumption;
336
2) Portion size should be appropriate to the setting
portrayed... ;337 and
3) Advertisements for food products should depict a
balance either in terms of nutrition or behavior, to
communicate the role of the product in the framework of
a healthy lifestyle.
338
Smalls then remarked that the channel had implemented a policy
to pull ads that did not meet these criteria, but did not have to,
because food advertisers had voluntarily changed their ads.33 9 That
all sounds quite impressive, but missing was any explanation of
Nickelodeon's oversight to ensure that its advertisers actually
333. See Marva Smalls, Executive Vice President, Nickelodeon, Moving the
Needle, Remarks at the Institute of Medicine Workshop on Strategies that
Foster Health Food and Beverage Choices in Children and Youth (Jan. 27,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/24/712/
0.pdf).
334. Id. at 11.
335. See e.g., Ellen Fried, Assessing Effectiveness of Self-Regulation: A Case
Study of the Children's Advertising Review Unit, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 93
(2006).
336. Smalls, supra note 333, at 11.
337. Id.
338. Id. Nickelodeon's policy is very similar to CARU's guidelines and it is
not clear exactly how it is stronger.
339. Id. at 12.
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continue to adhere to their rules (if indeed they ever did). Do they
have screeners who look for future violations? Do they have a com-
plaint process set up for viewers? Where is the accountability?
Demonstrating this lack of oversight, less than two months after
Nickelodeon's statement to the IOM committee, the company
announced a partnership with Dairy Queen to promote their "DQ
Crew Club" on Nickelodeon's Web site. 340 The DQ Crew Club is
aimed at children as young as age three and features 3D-Web games
and the chance to earn coins redeemable for prizes such as a twelve-
speed bike, a scooter, or rollerblades.
341
Typical Dairy Queen products include: the Brownie Earthquake,
the Chocolate Chip Cookie Dough Blizzard, sundaes, and banana
splits. 342 For meals, there's the Bacon Double Cheeseburger, fries,
hot dogs, and one chicken salad.343 It is unclear how such a menu
satisfies this Nickelodeon guideline: "Advertisements for food
products should depict a balance-to communicate the role of the
product in the framework of a healthy lifestyle."
344
Also, at the FTC meeting on marketing and childhood obesity,
Nickelodeon took the opportunity to announce that its popular
children's character, SpongeBob, would begin hawking spinach and
carrots.345 Notably lacking was any promise of removing his image
from such unhealthful products as Pop Tarts, Keebler Cheez-Its, and
Breyers cookie-dough ice cream. How can promises of marketing
healthful food have any measurable impact without any corre-
sponding policy to curb junk-food ads? Ms. Smalls also touted the
company's brief ad spots that encourage kids to be active.346 Such
moves are disingenuous to say the least, considering that the
340. Dairy Queen Partners with Nickelodeon to Promote New Online Kids
Site, QSR, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.qsrmagazine.com/shells/full.phtml?id
=4458.
341. Id.
342. Dairy Queen, Menu, http://www.dairyqueen.com/en-us/menus+and+
nutrition/menu/default.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
343. Id.
344. Smalls, supra note 333, at 11.
345. See Marva Smalls, Executive Vice President, Nickelodeon, Moving the
Needle, Remarks at the FTC Workshop, Perspectives on Marketing, Self-
Regulation and Childhood Obesity 280-281 (July 14-15, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Foodmarketingtokids/transcript
_050714.pdf).
346. See Smalls, supra note 333, at 8.
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company makes its money by keeping children from being active and
by bombarding them with ads for junk foods.
G. Children's Advertising Review Unit's "Compliance Rate"
At the FTC meeting last summer, CARU was placed on the
defensive with Senator Tom Harkin's opening remarks, in which he
said CARU "has become a poster child for how not to conduct self-
regulation."
347
Obviously feeling the need to respond, CARU's director,
Elizabeth Lascoutx spoke strongly about how effective the agency
was. Her strategy was to emphasize CARU's 97% "compliance
rate," giving the impression that self-regulation was a big success.
348
Using the term compliance rate conveys the idea that the industry is
in compliance with CARU's guidelines 97% of the time. This,
however, is not what Ms. Lascoutx meant. Her specific comment
was, "We have a compliance rate of over 97% when we ask for
modification." 349 This is very different than just saying "compliance
rate." The reality is that when CARU even bothers to take up a case,
the companies comply 97% of the time.
The other problem with this "compliance rate" is that it is
unverifiable. We really have no idea what it is based on. For
example, what are the criteria for determining what complies with a
request for modification? Sometimes a company says its ad cam-
paign that should be modified under the guidelines has already run
its course; does this count? It would be impossible for any
researcher to empirically duplicate these results.
Ms. Lascoutx also claimed, "We don't miss anything."350 How
she can claim that her six-person shop effectively monitors all the
ways that children are bombarded with marketing these days (let
alone food ads) is mind boggling. The bottom line is that to speak of
347. Senator Thomas Harkin, U.S. Senate, Remarks at the FTC Workshop,
Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation and Childhood Obesity 32 (July
14-15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Food
marketingtokids/transcript_050714.pdf).
348. Elizabeth Lascoutx, Dir., CARU, Remarks at the FTC Workshop,
Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation and Childhood Obesity, Day Two,
39 (July 14-15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/work
shops/Foodmarketingtokids/transcript._050715.pdf).
349. Id.
350. Id.
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a "97% compliance rate" is completely meaningless and therefore
intended to mislead the audience and deflect government action.
H Trade Group's Disingenuous Recommendations
Finally, much was said at the FTC workshop regarding GMA's
proposed recommendations to strengthen CARU. GMA was using
this event as an opportunity to gain positive PR for itself and its
members. First of all, news of the proposal was made available to
the press just prior to the event. The Wall Street Journal ran a story
about it the day before the meeting, before any advocates could
respond. 351 Next, several members of the food industry strategically
referenced the proposal before GMA took its turn in formally
presenting it on the second day.352 Thus, the public was given the
distinct impression that food companies were sincere in their concern
about the issue and were at-the-ready to strengthen the self-
regulatory system.
And yet, numerous questions remain about GMA's sincerity.
First of all, their statement only represents a tiny fraction of the trade
association's membership-9 out of 120 companies, a mere 7.5%.353
According to GMA, "[t]he statement was issued on behalf of
Campbell Soup Company; General Mills, Inc.; The Hershey
Company; Kellogg Company; Kraft Foods Inc.; Nestle USA;
PepsiCo, Inc.; Sara Lee Corporation; and Unilever United States,
Inc..."354
How can a statement that only represents nine companies speak
for the industry's largest and most powerful trade association?
Where do the other 131 companies stand on the matter? These
351. Sarah Ellison, Food Makers Propose Tougher Guidelines for
Children's Ads, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2005, at B 1.
352. See, e.g., Alan Harris, Executive Vice President, Kellogg Co., Remarks
at the FTC Workshop, Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation
and Childhood Obesity 259 (July 14-15, 2005) (transcript available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/Foodmarketingtokids/transcrip_050714.
pdf).
353. See Grocery Manufacturer's Ass'n, General Member Companies,
http://www.gmabrands.com/membership/general/generalmemlist.cfm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2005).
354. Press Release, Grocery Manufacturer's Ass'n, GMA Statement
Regarding Proposals to Strengthen Self-Regulation of Children's Advertising
(July 15, 2005), http://www.gmabrands.com/news/docs/NewsRelease.cfm?Doc
ID=1542&.
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companies include such members as Coca-Cola, Cadbury
Schweppes, and Mars, whose products are very much aimed at
children, especially in schools. 35 It is deceptive for GMA to present
itself as speaking for an entire industry, even if those nine companies
are among the "industry leaders."
Next, GMA's recommendations for improving CARU includes
"[e]xpand[ing] CARU's guidelines to address advertising contained
in commercial computer games, video games and interactive
websites." 356 This is progress, but if GMA really wants CARU to
expand its scope, how about recommending that CARU enforce its
guidelines in schools? Right now, CARU does nothing about in-
school promotions such as fundraisers at Chuck E. Cheese's
restaurants or contests sponsored by candy companies.
357
And what about ads children see on Channel One, which is
widely viewed in schools? Also, why is the selling of products in
schools not considered a form of promotion under CARU's purview?
GMA needs to include all forms of marketing to children in its
proposal if we are to believe that they are serious.
Next, GMA failed to disclose its record opposing even the most
nominal efforts by state governments to improve self-regulation. For
example, GMA sent a letter to the California Legislature in oppo-
sition to a joint resolution (meaning it was voluntary, without the
force of law) asking industry to simply adhere to a voluntary code of
practice with respect to food and beverage advertising. 351 If GMA is
in favor of self-regulation, then why oppose a bill that simply asks
industry to voluntarily comply with a set of nutrition guidelines?
Because GMA is not interested in actually adhering to any self-
regulatory system, but rather in creating the appearance of effective
self-regulation in order to deflect government action.
355. Grocery Manufacturer's Association, supra note 353.
356. Press Release, Grocery Manufacturer's Ass'n, supra note 354.
357. Caroline E. Mayer, Minding Nemo: Pitches to Kids Feed Debate About
a Watchdog, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, at F1.
358. Letter from Kristin Power, Dir., State Affairs, Grocery Manufacturer's
Ass'n, to Hon. Sheila Kuehl, Member, Cal. State Senate (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://www.gmabrands.com/industryaffairs/docs/comment.cfm?DocID= 1339.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Food and Beverage Companies Cannot Be Trusted
How can we possibly trust companies to self-regulate when
they:
1) Lobby vociferously against policies to improve chil-
dren's health;
2) Make misleading statements and misrepresent their
policies at government meetings and in other public
venues; and
3) Make public promises of corporate responsibility that
sound good, but in reality amount to no more than a
public relations campaign?
Food and beverage companies and their representatives have, at
every opportunity, proven that we cannot believe what they say. If
actions speak louder than words, then the activities described in this
article should be a deafening chorus of, "Do not trust us."
B. A Corporation's Legal Obligation Is to Shareholders
That industry cannot be trusted should really come as no
surprise. It is not a corporation's job to protect public health; that is
the government's role. A corporation's legal obligation is to make as
much money as possible for its shareholders, and all other concerns
must be secondary.35 9 In recent decades, there has been increased
debate over whether corporations should consider social goals, as
balanced against economic gains. Putting aside the moral impera-
tives that they do so, the question remains, does the law allow for so-
called "corporate social responsibility?" The modem debate is over
the extent to which the law should acknowledge the social
obligations of a corporation and take into account the interests of
outside "stakeholders," rather than just those of shareholders.
360
The traditional approach is advocated by Nobel Prize-winning
economist Milton Freidman who claims "the only social
359. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.2d 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
360. See Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Their
Beneficiaries: A Functional Approach to the Legal Institutionalization of
Corporate Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS'
LIABILITIES 149, 149-54 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985).
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responsibility of business is to make a profit."361 Those who espouse
this approach see the only role of the corporation as profit
maximization for shareholders, and view corporate social respon-
sibility for altruistic purposes as socialism.362  While corporate
managers should not completely ignore social concerns, they are to
act on them only when it would result in increased profits. 363 Under
the market system, a corporation that trades high social standards for
economic incentives will not be able to compete and, thus, will be
driven out of business.
364
Another approach embraces some social responsibility beyond
what the law requires; however, it is often questionable whether
corporations taking this approach are actually acting out of altruism
as they claim.365 An example of this approach is the Ben & Jerry's
strategy of "doing well by doing good" through a three-part mission
to achieve product, social, and economic greatness.366 The idea is
that if a corporation takes care of its customers, shareholders will
eventually benefit.367  While studies and success stories exist to
support this position,368 they are few and far between and any
aggregate benefits to society remain an open question. Meanwhile,
in 2000, Ben and Jerry's sold out for $326 million to multi-national
corporation Unilever, causing some observers to predict the end of
the company's socially-inclined agenda.369 The results since that
time have been mixed. While some original practices remain, other
commitments made by Unilever such as using more "fair trade"
suppliers and introducing an organic brand of ice cream were never
honored, causing a serious rift between Unilever and Ben & Jerry's
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founders.
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Furthermore, scandals such as those at Enron and WorldCom
have only furthered the public perception that corporations act only
in their own self-interests, often to the detriment of the public good.
Therefore, despite corporate attempts at proclaiming their allegiance
to the environment or some other social good, the underlying drive
for profit maximization remains. The food industry is just another
example of this model.
C. Government Must Protect Children
Because the food industry cannot be trusted to self-regulate, the
government must step in to protect children from the onslaught of
marketing that is significantly impacting their health and well-being.
How should the government do this exactly? One way is to give the
FTC back its full authority to regulate junk-food advertising aimed at
children, as Senator Tom Harkin proposes in his Healthy Lifestyles
and Prevention (HeLP) America Act of 2005. 37 1 This far-ranging
legislation addresses the following:
1) "Protect Kids from Unfair Junk-food Advertising:
Restores the rulemaking authority of the Federal Trade
Commission to issue restrictions on advertising with
respect to children."
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2) "Food Advertising in Schools: Gives Secretary of
Agriculture authority to prohibit the marketing and
advertising of food in schools participating in the School
Lunch or Breakfast programs.
3) "Harkin Fruit and Vegetable Program: Expands the
program to more schools and creates healthy cooking
demonstrations."
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4) "Nutrition Promotion and School Lunch Protection:
Requires USDA to update its definition of foods of
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minimal nutritional value, which has not changed in over
30 years, to conform with current nutrition science.
3 75
5) "Restaurant Nutrition Labeling: Requires nutritional
information on menus of chain restaurants."
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All of these ideas are excellent and would go a long way in
addressing the problem of junk-food marketing to children. It is
especially important to deal with these issues at the national level
because of the inefficiency in trying to pass bills state by state, not to
mention one school district at a time. And yet, local-level
policymaking is often all that advocates are left with because of the
insurmountable political hurdles that are ever-present at the federal
level and increasingly, as this Article demonstrates, at the state level.
Because the food and beverage industries will remain such a
powerful lobbying force, we must also begin a dialogue about
changing the government structures that allow industry to wield such
enormous influence over the public process. Therefore, the solution
lies not just in passing a new law, or in giving a government agency
more authority, but rather in examining our economic system at its
most fundamental levels and in understanding how the corporate
drive for profits has created this mess in the first place. We must
examine how government can be restructured to stop perpetuating
the problem and, instead, begin to solve it.
As long as the federal government maintains a hands-off policy
and permits corporate self-regulation, there will be no accountability
whatsoever. We are left with an unacceptable status quo (or worse)
for the foreseeable future. The stakes are far too high. We cannot
stand idly by and allow current and future generations of children to
suffer the consequences. We cannot grant corporations unfettered
access to young and vulnerable minds. If we do, we will all eventu-
ally pay the price.
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